The assessment places the country’s nuclear stockpile at about 190 warheads as of January 2026, up from around 180 a year earlier. It also indicates that a small number may now be associated with operational forces, most likely at sea, although the estimate carries significant uncertainty because nuclear deployments remain among the most closely guarded elements of national security policy.
New Delhi has not announced any formal change in its nuclear doctrine. Its stated posture remains anchored in credible minimum deterrence and a no-first-use commitment, with nuclear retaliation reserved for a major attack using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The latest estimate, however, suggests that operational practice may be evolving as the country expands its submarine-based deterrent and develops longer-range missile systems capable of covering targets well beyond the immediate neighbourhood.
The most sensitive element in the assessment concerns the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. The country now operates nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, including INS Arihant and INS Arighaat, while additional boats in the same class are being brought into service. The reported deployment of about 12 warheads is linked to the K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which has a range of roughly 700 kilometres. Longer-range K-4 missiles, designed to reach about 3,500 kilometres, are still moving towards full operational readiness after further tests.
The development is significant because a submarine-based force is intended to provide assured retaliation even if land-based assets are damaged in a first strike. That objective has driven investment in nuclear-powered submarines, undersea communications and missile development. A more mature sea-based deterrent also requires difficult command-and-control arrangements, since warheads placed on submarines must remain secure, survivable and under strict political control.
The shift comes against the backdrop of growing nuclear competition across Asia. China’s arsenal is estimated at around 620 warheads and is expanding faster than that of any other nuclear-armed state. Beijing has loaded missiles into new silo fields, developed road-mobile missile units and continued to strengthen its sea-based deterrent. Pakistan’s stockpile is assessed at about 170 warheads, with continuing work on land-based missiles, cruise missiles and tactical-range systems.
New Delhi’s strategic planning has traditionally been shaped by Pakistan, but its modernisation programme is increasingly focused on China. The Agni-V missile, with a range generally placed above 5,000 kilometres, and work on the Agni-P and other systems point to a force designed for wider geographic reach, higher survivability and more flexible deployment options. The country’s missile programme also reflects a shift from liquid-fuelled systems towards solid-fuelled, canisterised missiles that can be prepared for launch more quickly.
The broader global picture has also darkened. The world’s nine nuclear-armed states are estimated to hold about 12,187 warheads, of which roughly 9,745 are in military stockpiles for potential use. About 4,012 are assessed to be deployed with missiles and aircraft, while the rest remain in central storage. The United States and Russia still possess the overwhelming majority, but the pace of reductions has slowed as retired warheads are dismantled more gradually and new systems are added by several states.
The expiry of the New START treaty in February 2026 has removed the last major bilateral restraint on the strategic arsenals of Washington and Moscow. At the same time, China’s build-up, Russia’s nuclear signalling during the Ukraine war, NATO’s renewed focus on nuclear sharing and tensions in the Middle East have reinforced concerns that nuclear weapons are regaining prominence in national security strategies.
For New Delhi, the central issue is whether operational readiness can be strengthened without weakening crisis stability. Separating warheads from delivery systems has long been seen as a way to reduce the risk of accidental use, unauthorised launch or rapid escalation. Moving even a small number of warheads closer to deployment could shorten response times, but it also increases the burden on command systems and raises the stakes during confrontation.
