Opportunityto find a lasting solution
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
Pakistan’s military appears to have finally realized the futility of continued confrontation with India at the Siachen Glacier. There are perhaps a number of factors which have brought about this change of heart. Cooling of relations with the United States of America, economic distress, internal threat from terrorism and the loss of nearly 150 lives at Gyari seem to spur this new thinking. The avalanche hit the military camp in the early hours of April 7. The dead at Gyari are buried under thousands of tonnes of snow and it will be some time before their bodies can be dug out and given proper burial. This tragedy seems to have created a ground swell in the country against aimless confrontation with India at this most inhospitable terrain.
The 1947-48 operations in J and K ended by delineating the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) under the aegis of the U N (Karachi Agreement ) only up to Point NJ 9842 on the Saltoro Range in the area of Shyok Valley (South of Siachen Glacier). Beyond Point NJ 9842, the CFL is meant to run ‘thence North to the glaciers’. While the entire area is glaciated, it is the wording, ‘thence North’ (grid North/magnetic North or generally North!) which determines the specific line and direction. According to India, this line runs along the Saltoro Range, (North of Pt NJ 8942 ) whereas Pakistan has been interpreting the line to run towards the Karakoram Pass (North-Eastwards)
Pakistan had been sending international expeditions across the Siachen to the peaks east of it. During April 1984 intelligence reports indicated that the Pakistan Army was geared up to occupy the Saltoro Range which runs along the Western flank of the Siachen. The Indian Army realising the import of this move and the subsequent difficulties of dislodging the Pakistan Army from Saltoro Range, preempted the Pakistan Army and occupied this mountain range. Since then the Pakistan Army has made many unsuccessful attempts, at great cost, to gain a foothold on the Saltoro Range. Finally, it did succeed by landing troops by helicopters at an impossible peak and called this post, ‘Quaid’. It was a Herculian task for the Indian Army to evict Pakistani troops from this post and in the process lost a number of soldiers and officers. An Indian post was established on this peak and named ‘Bana Post’ after the JCO who led the final charge to capture ‘Quaid’.
Some Indian defence analysts have tried to project the Siachen as an area of great strategic importance. To the west of it (across the Saltoro Range) is the road linking Gilgit with Zinjiang and to the north-east is the important Karakoram Pass.To the north is the Shaksgam Valley(part of J and K) ceded to China by Pakistan. It is often contended by experts that the Siachen region would facilitate a link-up between POK and China, across the Karakoram Pass, on one side and for India to intercept the Gilgit -Zinjiang road on the other.
The Gilgit-Zinjiang road is nearly 250 km across the most forbidding terrain. The Karakoram Pass from the glacier is across a group of first magnitude peaks in the world, which only a small mountaineering expedition can hope to traverse. The Shaksgam valley across the Indra Col (named by the Workman couple who, crossing over the Bilafondla Pass on the Saltoro Range, in 1911-12, camped on the Siachen and named it after goddess Lakshmi) on the Karakoram Range is inaccessible from the glacier region. The route to the Karakoram Pass emanates from the Nubra valley and is well away from the glacier. Another route is along the Shyok River. So, a viable link-up between POK and Tibet across the Karakoram Passis not feasible. In any case, Indian troops are camped at Daulat-Beg Oldi, just below the Karakoram Pass.
Terrain and climate at the Saltoro Range is most forbidding where even a few steps can leave one gasping for breath. Some Indian posts are at heights above 21,000 feet. Unable to evacuate due to bad weather, etc, the Indian Army, over the years, has lost many lives due to high altitude sickness. The cold gets to one’s bones and the constant fear of being afflicted by one of those high- altitude sicknesses during night or bad weather and the impossibility of being evacuated under such conditions has a depressing psychological effect on the mind. Indian troops and their officers have endured these hardships and afflictions for 28 years with rare stoicism and forbearance.
Of late, there have been renewed attempts by India to improve relations with Pakistan through dialogue and trade. Both sides appear to realise the futility of maintaining a hostile attitude towards each other. The policy of exporting terrorism to India has finally recoiled on Pakistan itself. It is a case of chickens coming home to roost. This push to terrorism, its effect on the country’s economy due to the disturbed environment and excessive expenditure on defence has left its finances in dire straits.
The last attempt to resolve the glacier issue got stalled on the requirement of authentication and demarking the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on maps, held by the two sides, before troops could be withdrawn and the area declared demilitarised. The Pakistan Army did not agree to this requirement. Perhaps due to the fact that all this while the Pakistan public has been made to believe that its army is in part occupation of the Siachen. Marking positions on the map would have exposed this lie. Further, the Indian Army has reason to suspect that once positions on the Saltoro Range are evacuated, Pakistan may occupy these and the cost in lives in taking these back will be prohibitive.
There is some justification in the Indian Army’s apprehensions. Those of the Indian Army who have operated on the LoC in J and K invariably experienced trust deficit with the Pakistan Army. Since there are large gaps in Indian posts along the LoC, it has been a practice with the Pakistan Army to, now and then, ingress across the LoC into Indian territory and establish a post. It takes considerable effort and loss of life to evict such
Pakistani posts. Therefore, there is some justification on the part of the Indian Army to be wary of entering into an agreement without iron-clad guarantees.
Then there are larger issues which have created a climate of suspicion between the two countries. Pakistan feels that it was cheated out of the Saltoro Range in 1984 by India, and New Delhi has Kargil as a constant reminder of Islamabad’s perfidy. But it is time to shed this mindset and move forward. So many valuable lives have been lost to terrain and climate, on both sides, due to the inability of these two countries to resolve this not-so-intractable a problem.
It has been India’s view that Pakistan’s defence policy towards this country is dictated by its army. Jolted by the latest tragedy at Gyari, and the groundswell at home against this costly adventure of hanging on to the idea of Siachen, the Pakistan Army appears to realise the futility of being at the most inhospitable terrain on earth, coupled with its inability to dislodge the Indian Army from the Saltoro Range.
Gen Ashfaque Kayani, chief of the Pakistani military, has finally struck a reconciliatory note and appears amenable to a reasonable resolution of the Siachen problem. Here, perhaps, is an opportunity to get to grips with the Siachen issue and work out a reasonable and lasting solution of this problem.
The writer is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff.
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