By Ashok Nilakantan Ayers
NEW YORK: The reported praise by The New York Times for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s international leadership has attracted attention in India, particularly because the newspaper has frequently scrutinised his domestic governance. Social media commentary has gone further, suggesting that the American newspaper has placed Modi one notch above US President Donald Trump in global leadership. The distinction between what the newspaper actually reported and what commentators have inferred is important.
The relevant article is Anupreeta Das’s “Modi Is Hedging Against Trump, One Deal at a Time,” . Its central argument is that Modi has accelerated India’s engagement with countries across the world as the United States under Trump has become a less dependable economic partner. It examines diplomatic initiatives, trade agreements and strategic partnerships rather than offering a formal ranking of world leaders. The available article does not establish that Modi has been ranked above Trump in a global leadership league table.
That qualification matters because the newspaper’s analysis is more interesting than a simple declaration of victory for Modi. It describes a country attempting to protect its economic interests in a more unpredictable world—and a prime minister whose extensive foreign travel has become an instrument of that strategy.
The newspaper’s assessment rests on a specific geopolitical calculation: India cannot afford to depend excessively on one powerful partner, particularly when that partner’s policies threaten its exports, investment prospects and strategic interests.
Modi’s earlier approach to Washington placed considerable emphasis on his personal rapport with Trump. Their public appearances projected political chemistry and the possibility of a stronger partnership between the world’s largest democracy and its most powerful economy. But the relationship became more difficult when Trump imposed additional tariffs on Indian goods and penalised India over its purchases of Russian oil. Trump’s repeated assertions that he had helped end the India–Pakistan conflict in May 2025 also caused friction with New Delhi.
Modi’s response, as Das describes it, has been to diversify India’s international relationships. Instead of relying on Washington alone, India has pursued closer economic and strategic ties with Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and other partners. This is the essence of the article’s argument: Modi’s diplomatic outreach is increasingly about reducing India’s vulnerability to decisions taken elsewhere.
There is a difference between praising a leader’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances and declaring that his overall leadership is superior to another leader’s. The NYT article principally makes the former argument.
The article does not rely solely on photographs of Modi shaking hands with foreign leaders or addressing overseas audiences. It identifies specific initiatives with economic and strategic implications.
– European Union: India and the EU concluded negotiations for a free-trade agreement on January 27, 2026. The agreement followed years of negotiations and offered the prospect of substantially improved market access, although implementation and ratification remain crucial.
– United Kingdom: The India–UK trade agreement reached in 2025 provides for tariff reductions and improved market access. The British government estimates that bilateral trade could increase by £25.5 billion annually in the long run. That is a projection, not t
– European Free Trade Association: The trade and economic partnership agreement with Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein entered into force on October 1, 2025. It establishes a framework for deeper economic engagement, including investment ambitions that must be assessed against subsequent performance.
– Germany and France: The NYT identifies submarine-technology cooperation with Germany and partnerships with France involving artificial intelligence, research and student mobility.
– South Korea and New Zealand: The newspaper highlights prospective investment, shipbuilding cooperation and maritime security. These initiatives connect diplomacy with industrial capacity and the security of important sea routes.
Taken together, these examples provide a reasonable basis for describing Modi’s diplomacy as more commercially focused. They suggest that India is seeking technology, industrial investment, access to overseas markets and more resilient supply chains, rather than merely collecting diplomatic honours.
Yet the distinction between an agreement and its consequences is indispensable. A signed trade pact is a meaningful institutional achievement; a political declaration is a statement of intent; an investment pledge is not the same as capital actually invested. Jobs promised are not necessarily jobs created. The NYT article identifies initiatives and their potential benefits. It does not establish that every initiative has already delivered its advertised economic returns.
This is where the praise must be balanced against legitimate domestic scrutiny. Modi’s overseas travel has been extensive. An analysis published by The Print in May 2026 reported that he had made approximately 100 international visits, covering at least 80 countries during his first 12 years in office. The same analysis counted 71 visits to around 46 countries for Manmohan Singh during his decade as prime minister, and 69 country visits for Indira Gandhi over approximately 15 years. These comparisons depend on how visits and countries are counted, but they establish the scale of Modi’s diplomatic activity.
Travel alone, however, cannot establish either success or failure. Jawaharlal Nehru’s diplomatic influence, for example, was shaped by the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, his engagement with newly independent countries and his role in defining India’s postcolonial international identity. Such influence cannot be measured simply by counting the countries visited.
Equally, Modi’s travel should not be dismissed merely because earlier prime ministers travelled less. India’s economy, international trade exposure, diaspora, technological ambitions and security challenges have changed considerably.
The more serious question is whether the frequency of travel produces results that could not have been achieved through ministers, diplomats, commercial negotiations or virtual engagement.
The expenditure figures are substantial. According to a parliamentary disclosure reported by The Indian Express in August 2026, the government reported expenditure of approximately ₹557.51 crore on the prime minister’s foreign visits between 2021 and 2026, covering the period specified in the parliamentary question. A separate government disclosure put expenditure for 2025 alone at around ₹180 crore, with reporting varying slightly according to the figures and period cited. These amounts should not be casually added together because the periods overlap.
The cost is not automatically wasteful: international travel can support negotiations, defence cooperation, crisis management and investment promotion. But neither is it beyond scrutiny because the traveller is the prime minister.
A meaningful public assessment would compare expenditure with measurable outcomes: export growth, investment actually received, technology transferred, employment created and improvements in market access. The government should make such assessments accessible, country by country, rather than relying principally on announcements and ceremonial imagery.
The criticism that Modi’s travels generate memoranda of understanding but not sufficient tangible benefits deserves serious examination. It is also too sweeping to conclude that the agreements have produced nothing.
An MoU may establish a framework for cooperation without creating a legally binding commercial obligation. It can be the first step towards a project, but it can also remain unimplemented because of financing problems, regulatory obstacles, political changes or a lack of commercial viability.
Trade agreements are different. They can establish enforceable rules and reduce tariffs, subject to their terms, ratification and implementation. The India–EU agreement and the India–UK trade deal therefore represent more substantial institutional developments than a routine declaration of friendship.
The EU’s own assessment, however, offers a useful caution. Despite the conclusion of the FTA negotiations, the European Commission has identified continuing barriers to trade and investment with India. It has emphasised that implementation will determine whether the agreement delivers concrete benefits. That is precisely the test Modi’s economic diplomacy must pass.
India needs independently verifiable figures on how much promised investment has arrived, how many factories have been established, what additional exports have been generated and how many jobs have been created. Announced investment totals should be distinguished from realised foreign direct investment, while projected trade increases should not be presented as actual gains. Without that distinction, both the government’s claims of success and its critics’ claims of failure risk becoming political assertions rather than evidence-based conclusions.
A prime minister’s international stature cannot be separated entirely from his domestic record. Nor should a newspaper’s assessment of foreign policy be interpreted as an endorsement of everything that leader does at home.
Critics of Modi have raised concerns about unemployment, economic inequality, religious polarisation, press freedom, democratic institutions and the treatment of minorities. They have also questioned whether the political attention devoted to foreign engagements is matched by adequate attention to domestic priorities. These are separate questions from whether India has improved its international partnerships. They require their own evidence and analysis.
A country can become more influential internationally while continuing to struggle with serious domestic problems. Diplomatic success does not automatically resolve unemployment, improve public health, strengthen social cohesion or guarantee institutional accountability.
There is, nevertheless, a legitimate domestic argument in favour of foreign engagement. Better market access can benefit exporters; technology partnerships can support manufacturing; defence cooperation can strengthen national security; and international investment can create employment. The connection between diplomacy and domestic welfare is real, but it must be demonstrated rather than assumed.
The strongest criticism of Modi’s foreign policy, therefore, is not that he travels too much simply because India has problems at home. It is that his government must demonstrate that the time and money invested abroad produce sufficient returns for people at home.
The NYT analysis is best understood as an assessment of strategic adaptation. With Washington becoming a less predictable partner, India has sought to widen its options without abandoning its relationships with the United States or Russia. This is consistent with India’s long standing pursuit of strategic autonomy, updated for a period of trade disputes, geopolitical competition and supply-chain uncertainty.
Modi deserves credit where his government has negotiated meaningful trade arrangements, expanded technology cooperation and strengthened India’s ability to work with different centres of power. Those achievements should be acknowledged regardless of whether one supports his domestic politics.
But three qualifications remain essential. First, diplomatic visibility is not the same as diplomatic success. The number of countries visited is an input, not an outcome. Second, agreements are not economic results. Their value must be judged by implementation, actual investment, trade flows, technology transfer and employment. Third, international influence is not a comprehensive measure of leadership. A prime minister’s record also encompasses economic management, democratic accountability, social cohesion and the welfare of citizens.
The comparison with Trump should be treated with similar care. Modi’s strategy of diversifying India’s partnerships may contrast with the disruption caused by Trump’s tariff policies. But that does not establish that Modi is categorically a better leader. The two men operate in different political systems, with different responsibilities and national interests.
The most defensible conclusion is that the NYT article recognises a significant feature of Modi’s third-term diplomacy: India is attempting to turn global uncertainty into an opportunity to broaden its strategic and economic choices. Whether that strategy ultimately succeeds will depend less on how many times Modi boards an aircraft or how warmly foreign leaders greet him than on what India gains when the negotiations are over.
For the Indian taxpayer, the final measure should be straightforward: more trade, more productive investment, better technology, stronger security and more jobs. If the diplomatic activity delivers these outcomes, the expenditure may prove worthwhile. If the agreements remain largely on paper, no amount of international praise can substitute for results. That is the standard against which Modi’s global leadership—and the claims made about the New York Times’s assessment of it—should be judged. (IPA Service)
