By Krishna Jha
It is again Rafale at our door steps as the controversy lands in Supreme Court for the third time. Apart from other issues, question involves also the fact that the deal was made at 41.47 percent higher a rate than the one made earlier. Dassault claimed a1.4 billion euro cost for the ‘design and development’ of 13 India Specific Enhancements, that is, additional capabilities in the form of hardware as well as software that had been specified by the Indian Air Force all along, and this cost was negotiated down to 1.3 billion euro. What it meant was that the design and development cost, now distributed over 36 Rafale fighter jets, shot up from 11.11 million euro per aircraft in 2007 to 36.11 million euro when the deal was struck in 2016.
On September23, 2016, the Narendra Modi government finalised a 59 thousand crore intergovernmental Agreement with France for the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jets, at the cost of 7.87 billion euro. The Rafale is a twin engine fighter aircraft.
If one were to say that the amount paid towards “design and development” is indeed the fixed cost for development of the India Specific Enhancements (ISEs), it logically would mean one thing: that the amortisation cost absorbed in the 36 fly-away aircraft (which, as per the NDA government’s decision, ought to have been spread across the 126 MMRCAs), and which, with the number shrunk to 36 pushed up the procurement cost per MMRCA in the 2016 deal.
It has always brought a graveyard silence whenever our democratic institutions succumbed to make way for any such deal. A deal that contains luscious gains for certain sections while many others perish quietly. Swimming smoothly through all the hurdles, finally getting the signal from the Parliament that amounted only to a ritual with the majority the government had, the Rafale deal was stamped and finalized.
It may be pointed out that it was not only the civil bureaucracies and the ministry of defence (MoD) itself, but there were the Ministry of Law and Justice (MoL&J); the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the Attorney General for India, and two other constitutional authorities, the Supreme Court (SC), and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG); other than the Parliament that played their own role in it. Only exceptions were the MoD and Mo L&J, though usually subservient, tried to act but not quite effectively.
The Attorney General for India, the Supreme Court and the CAG were to` see to it that entire initiative along with the procedure and the processes were interpreted properly, according to the rule of law, so that it can be accepted in a democracy that abides by the Constitution, and is run with the separation of power, checks and balances, and an independent judiciary.
But all the three pillars failed the nation.
Instead of playing their constitutional role, they became servile, surrendering their powers to the government and thus losing their eminence. It was no more the nation and its constitution, but the government that made them act according to their mere wishes. Same was true about the apex court. The Supreme Court itself failed to serve the cause. Going into the depths of the deal itself, it blundered on many accounts. The judgement on the sealed envelope was the ultimate, apart from other glaring ones.
The explanation given was unbelievable as it said that pricing details were shared with the CAG and that the report had been examined by the Public Accounts Committee with redacting, which is obscuring portions and presented before the Parliament. The Apex Court overlooked many other issues of significance as transfer of technology and indigenous licensed production in India. It also could not meet the challenges faced by the sanctity of rules, procedures, and the rule of law, the basics of our constitutional democracy.
Then comes the role of CAG. The constitutional institution, with its prime role, the CAG too failed the nation. It was painful even to accept the fact the prime organisation of the country, the conscience keeper, had played a major role when the clause, that had spelt out clearly its stance that was anti- corruption was removed and critical details were kept away from the public eye. These are unforgettable details that the next generation would have to face about the supreme audit institution.
In a three-part investigative series put out by a French news website, particularly the last part, which allegedly brought into light the role of an agent in the Rafale deal, several issues emerge.
One is about the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013, under which the deal was concluded, that mandates that “all actions regarding procurement of any equipment are totally transparent and carried out as per established procedures” and makes it incumbent for the supplier “to accept our standard clauses regarding agents/agency commission, penalty for use of undue influence and Integrity Pact, access to books of accounts, arbitration and laws which would be incorporated in the contract.”
It is interesting to note here that according to revelations made about the deal, this was simply not there in the Rafale deal. It was precluded by the last-minute removal of the anti-corruption prescriptions in the DPP 2013 saying, “Can the Centre outright invoke the provisions of para 23.1 of the DPP, 2013.
A fresh petition has been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the Rafale Deal in the light of fresh exposure made in the French media. Reports say that the apex court may hear the petition. It will be in the best national interests if the esteemed judges of Supreme Court gives a relook at the deal at an early date. (IPA Service)
