Need to enhance generation capacity and thorium tech
Tapping new energy sources is not a choice but is imperative, given the country’s heavy reliance on fuel imports. As the demand-supply gap in energy availability is widening India has to plan for harnessing nuclear energy on a bigger scale.
The present nuclear capacity of about 3000 MW is approximately 2.5% of total installed capacity. The vision document of the department of atomic energy (DAE) envisages a nuclear power capacity of 20,000 MW by 2020.
The Nuclear Power Corporation has demonstrated its capability by taking up construction of nine units at five (out of six) different locations. It is quite feasible that in a period of nine years, six units could be planned per location. With such a pace of project implementation, at six sites, we can complete 36 units in nine years.
This means 36 units of 1000 MW each giving a total of 36,000 MW within nine years. This is quite possible and the planners should move in this direction. NPCIL is progressively improving its project management capability. It completed units 3 and 4 of Tarapur Atomic Power Station and unit 3 of Kaiga Power Station in five years, with huge savings in cost and gestation periods.
At the start of the Tenth Plan, India’s nuclear plant capacity was about 2,500 MW, and the plants were running at more than 85% capacity. But the current overall plant load factor is less than 60%. This implies that our nuclear power plants have inadequate fuel supply. While the capital cost of nuclear plants is comparatively high, the generation cost is somewhat balanced by the far lower fuel cost. But when fuels are imported, prices need monitoring. Long-term investment in nuclear plants may increase substantially provided there is safeguard tie-up in terms of long-term contract with guaranteed fuel availability and the degree of price variations during the contract period.
A major constraint in developing large capacity in India has been the limited availability of uranium. The shortage is felt even for the present capacity, as reflected in the low capacity utilisation rate. The focus should, therefore, be on indigenous technology development. Thorium technology may be an appropriate future strategy. Unlike natural uranium, thorium does not have any fissionable isotopes. Thorium needs to be used in some other system to convert it into fossil uranium-233, which can then undergo fission to generate electricity. Thorium utilisation depends on the accumulation of uranium-233 essential stock.
Thus, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, which is one of the thrust areas of India’s nuclear programme, and the Fast Breeder Reactors using thorium could definitely boost the country’s nuclear generation capacity development programme. It is in this context that the agreement between the US and India would prove a landmark achievement of the government and may usher in global understanding on the use of nuclear fuel for India’s nuclear plants.
It is to be noted that India’s understanding with the USA is on the basis that (i) India will not accept any kind of restriction on its strategic programme, (ii) its own R&D programme should not be hampered, and (iii) its agreement should not remain just a bilateral agreement but must cover the 45 Nuclear Supplier Group nations.
There is global consensus that nuclear plants could provide safe and reliable power supply, though issues of nuclear waste management and radiation are raised at various platforms. Regulators and governments together will ensure that power plants are run with utmost caution and care.
There are three issues that India needs to consider in any agreement on nuclear energy. Does the agreement contain guarantees for uninterrupted supply of fuel for the lifetime of imported reactors? Can the spent fuel be processed for use in future fast breeder reactors? Does the agreement, in any way, constrain India’s strategic nuclear weapons programme, including its right and freedom to test nuclear weapons, should the need arise?
Under Article 14 of the 123 Agreement, the US could seek termination of the agreement and return of nuclear fuel in the event of a nuclear test by India. But the entire process would involve detailed consultations, with the US giving due consideration to India’s security imperatives. Any agreement for import of reactors from the US should contain specific provisions that India reserves the right to import fuel for US-supplied reactors from other countries.
These developments have unfolded enormous opportunities for India on the nuclear front. The decisive factors here would be the cost of nuclear plants, competitive power tariff and long-term fuel arrangement with assured availability. It is imperative to recall Dr Bhabha’s remark, made four decades ago, that “no power is costlier than no power” meaning the lack of power could impose a severe economic penalty. With the national electrical peak capacity deficit estimated at about 29%, the loss of production in the economy from power shortage is enormous. The case for according higher priority to nuclear power is strong and deserves serious consideration in the 12th Five-Year Plan.
The author is professor of economics & energy at Management Development Institute, Gurgaon
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