By T N Ashok
NEW YORK: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to SCO at Tianjin in China with an arm stretched out for Xi Jinping has taken the world by surprise, especially the USA which was building the Asian giant as a counterweight to China in the Quad to oppose its moves in the south china seas As the details of Xi-Modi meeting on Sunday came out, the top policy makers in all the western capitals have started dissecting whether there has been real tilt by Indian PM away from Washington.
Veteran US & European diplomats wonder how genuine PM Modi’s pivot to China could be , given the fact that he skipped one of the meetings of SCO soon after the Galwan clashes in Himalayan valley and suspended flights to Beijing, and whether he did not invoke conflict of interests by sitting in the Quad to oppose China and at the same time seeking China’s support with Russia by having a seat at the table in the SCO, which is growing rapidly into a formidable grouping countering US sponsored QUAD.
So, when Narendra Modi stepped onto the tarmac at Tianjin and had 50 minute talks with President Xi Jinping, it was more than a diplomatic courtesy call. It marked the first substantive bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping since the deadly Galwan Valley clashes of 2020, when soldiers from both sides fell on Himalayan heights. For five years, relations between Asia’s two giants had been trapped in a deep freeze: trade spats, troop build-ups, and diplomatic barbs.
Yet now, with Trump’s Washington slamming New Delhi with 50% tariffs on Russian crude imports and threatening penalties over “strategic sovereignty violations,” Modi found himself clasping Xi’s hand.
The images were jarring: the world’s most strident anti-China hawk in Indian politics suddenly speaking of “civilisational friendship.” Was this genuine reconciliation, tactical hedging, or simply performance in the theatre of great power politics?
To call this a “pivot” would be misleading. India’s foreign policy rarely pivots; it hedges. Since the Cold War, New Delhi has preferred “strategic autonomy” over permanent alignments. But the optics matter. Xi, under Western sanctions and economic slowdown, gains a narrative win: India, once touted as America’s counterweight, now publicly embraces Beijing. Modi, battered by Trump’s tariffs and the political cost of inflation at home, signals he has options.
Yet beneath the photo-ops, trust remains important. For India, China is still the adversary on the border and the rival in the Indian Ocean. Modi’s Tianjin stop was not the beginning of a pro-China tilt, but a calculated reminder to Washington: India will not be treated as a client state. India is not subordinate, India will not bend, India will not kneel to anyone in the global theatre of politics — when it seeks to outstrip Germany and Japan to occupy the world’s 3rd largest nation with a $5 trillion economy by 2030.
Yes, though calibrated. Trump’s tariff war—effectively punishing India for buying cheap Russian oil—pushed New Delhi into search of leverage. The White House’s message was clear: comply with U.S. sanctions or face economic consequences. India’s counter-message in Tianjin was equally blunt: we have alternatives. If America insists on “sovereignty interference,” India can explore the dragon’s embrace.
This is not betrayal, but bargaining. Modi’s foreign policy is transactional: if Washington wants India as a frontline ally against China, it must treat it as an equal partner, not a subordinate. If Trump can use tariffs as a bargaining chip to buy India’s loyalty and stop it from buying Russian oil, Modi can use China as his barter for fomenting trade relations on a more even keel.
Here lies the irony. The West criticises India for purchasing discounted Russian crude. Yet European refiners have quietly been buying Russian-origin petroleum products processed in India’s private sector Jamnagar and public sector refineries. American traders have found indirect routes to secure Russian fertilizers through Indian intermediaries.
India’s argument is simple: why should New Delhi sacrifice cheap energy when the West itself bends rules in private? Trump’s tariffs, therefore, look less like principle and more like punishment for refusing to play by Washington’s script.
By highlighting this hypocrisy, Modi gains domestic legitimacy. He is not just buying Russian oil; he is exposing Western double standards. Europe needs Russian gas and oil for its winter energy needs. No compromise or no sanctions operate here. China is the biggest buyer of Russian oil, yet it is spared but India punished. Why? US dare not annoy China, its biggest trading partner and its rival in geopolitics and trade.
For Xi, the meeting is both an opportunity and experiment. He wants to test whether India, under tariff pressure from the U.S., might soften its role as the “Asian counterweight.”But Beijing’s generosity rarely comes without strings. Observers in Delhi whisper that China may dangle the prospect of limited disengagement at Galwan or trade incentives in electronics—on the condition India tones down its Quad enthusiasm or accepts Beijing’s pre-eminence in the South China Sea.
Whether Modi bites is another matter. India has not forgotten Galwan, nor Beijing’s continuing military build-up along the Line of Actual Control. Xi can offer carrots, but the stick remains in the Himalayas.
This is the nightmare scenario for Indian strategists. Some Chinese analysts suggest that reconciliation must begin with “clarification of boundaries”—an euphemism for India accepting Chinese claims in parts of Arunachal Pradesh or Ladakh.
It is politically impossible. No Indian leader, least of all Modi, could concede an inch of Galwan territory after 2020. Any such move would be career-ending. What Xi may achieve instead is symbolic: small troop withdrawals, reactivated border trade posts, or limited visa relaxations. Enough to suggest “peaceful intentions,” but not enough to resolve the border. The chessboard remains contested.
For Beijing, India’s role in the Quad (alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia) is proof of New Delhi’s alignment with the American Indo-Pacific strategy. Joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and intelligence-sharing agreements reinforce the impression.
Yet Xi also recognises India’s ambiguity. New Delhi has refused to sign a formal military alliance, has not stationed foreign bases on its soil, and insists the Quad is not “Asian NATO.” Modi’s visit is Beijing’s test: can India play both sides long enough to be useful?
The answer may be yes. India will never abandon the Quad—it is too valuable a hedge against Chinese assertiveness. But it may soften its rhetoric, keeping Beijing guessing while continuing quiet cooperation with Washington and Tokyo.
Here lies the paradox of Indian diplomacy. Modi attends Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summits hosted by Xi and Putin, even as he participates in Quad naval drills in the Bay of Bengal. On paper, the two blocs are ideologically opposed: SCO is a Eurasian security club dominated by China and Russia; Quad is a maritime alliance aimed at curbing Chinese expansion.
But India thrives on this duality. As one Indian diplomat put it, “We are members of both because we want influence in both.” New Delhi sells itself as the indispensable swing power: too large to ignore, too independent to bind. The question is how long such double-game diplomacy can last before one camp calls the bluff.
De-dollarisation has become the new rallying cry of the Global South, especially within BRICS. Russia, under sanctions, pushes hardest; China dreams of a yuan-centric system. China bailed Russia out of US sanctions by trading in Yuan instead of the US greenback.
India is cautious. While sympathetic to reducing dollar dependence, New Delhi knows its economy is still deeply tied to Western capital markets, dollar-denominated debt, and Wall Street investors. Thus, India’s approach is pragmatic: experiment with local-currency trade within BRICS, while keeping the dollar as anchor. It is not about replacing the dollar, but reducing exposure. A middle path, again.
The backdrop to all of this remains Washington. Trump’s tariffs, pitched as punishment for India’s Russian oil imports, are in fact a blunt instrument of coercive diplomacy. But they may have backfired. Rather than isolating Moscow, they have pushed India closer to Beijing. Rather than securing loyalty, they have reminded New Delhi that America’s embrace can be suffocating. For India, the lesson is clear: tariffs today, sanctions tomorrow. Better to keep multiple options alive.
So, has Modi pivoted to China? Not exactly. What he has done is more subtle—and more characteristic of Indian foreign policy. He has reminded both Washington and Beijing that India cannot be taken for granted. Xi sees opportunity, but not trust. Trump sees defiance, but not betrayal. Modi sees leverage—precisely the currency a middle power must wield in a fracturing world order.
The illusion is that India is aligning. The reality is that India is recalibrating: not for America, not for China, not even for Russia, but for India itself. In the great game of 21st-century geopolitics, New Delhi plays not pawn or knight, but swing piece—sometimes defensive, sometimes offensive, always indispensable. And if that frustrates both Washington and Beijing, so much the better. (IPA Service)
