A Muslim woman’s right to maintenance was upheld by the Supreme Court, reaffirming that rulings issued by a Sharia Court or a Court of Kazi carry no legal force under the framework of Indian law.
Delivering the judgement on 4 February, made public on 22 April, a bench comprising Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah reiterated the position that had been firmly established a decade ago in the 2014 decision of *Vishwa Lochan Madan v Union of India*. The Court emphasised that fatwas or other religious edicts have no binding effect within the Indian legal system, firmly anchoring the supremacy of the Constitution over religious adjudication.
The case concerned a Muslim woman who had sought maintenance from her estranged husband. Instead of resolving the matter through established judicial channels, the man argued that the issue had already been settled by a Kazi’s ruling. The Supreme Court dismissed this defence, underlining that no order issued by any Sharia Court or religious body could override the authority of the civil courts or negate a citizen’s right to legal recourse as provided by law.
Justice Dhulia, writing for the bench, stated that private religious bodies cannot assume judicial functions in a Constitutional democracy. He stressed that such bodies may offer advice or issue opinions within their community, but these pronouncements remain advisory and lack any coercive or enforceable authority. Any attempt to enforce such rulings would amount to a violation of the rule of law, he pointed out.
The Court’s decision underscores a growing judicial consensus aimed at reinforcing the primacy of formal legal institutions over parallel religious adjudicatory systems. It sends a clear message that while freedom of religion is constitutionally protected, it cannot extend to creating alternative structures that undermine the rule of law or the rights of individuals, particularly those of women seeking justice.
This ruling marks another milestone in the ongoing evolution of the Indian judiciary’s approach to personal law matters, particularly where they intersect with constitutional principles such as equality and due process. The Court noted that although parties are free to follow religious practices voluntarily, they cannot be compelled to do so, nor can religious institutions impose decisions that are inconsistent with national law.
The 2014 verdict in *Vishwa Lochan Madan* had already established the principle that fatwas are non-binding and that any attempt to enforce them forcibly is illegal. The current decision builds upon that precedent, giving it renewed relevance in contemporary disputes where religious rulings are presented as substitutes for formal judicial decisions.
Legal experts view this development as a critical affirmation of secular governance. By delineating the boundaries between religious advice and enforceable law, the Court has ensured that individuals cannot be deprived of their fundamental rights on the basis of extrajudicial pronouncements. Advocates working in the field of women’s rights have welcomed the judgement as a necessary corrective against the misuse of religious authority to evade civil responsibilities such as maintenance obligations.
The ruling also highlights the judiciary’s sensitivity to the potential coercive impact of religious rulings, especially on vulnerable individuals. The Court observed that a fatwa or any similar religious opinion can have persuasive value only if voluntarily accepted by all parties involved; it cannot, under any circumstance, override statutory rights or be used to deny legal entitlements guaranteed by secular courts.
The present case illustrated how reliance on a religious decision to avoid maintenance obligations can lead to a denial of justice. By rejecting such reliance, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that access to civil remedies must be universally available and cannot be curtailed through extralegal means.
The judgement arrives at a time when debates around the interplay between religious practices and constitutional rights continue to shape public discourse. Issues involving personal law reform, particularly concerning the rights of women in marriage, divorce, and maintenance, have attracted sustained attention across the political and legal spectrum. Against this backdrop, the Court’s unequivocal assertion of legal supremacy over religious rulings reinforces its commitment to ensuring that fundamental rights are not subverted under the guise of community or religious norms.
Justices Dhulia and Amanullah’s pronouncements reflect a judicial philosophy rooted in the belief that pluralism must be harmonised with constitutionalism. Their insistence that religious opinions must remain advisory, rather than mandatory, preserves both the right to religious freedom and the integrity of the rule of law.
This balance is particularly vital in cases concerning maintenance, a legal right aimed at ensuring that individuals are not left destitute following marital breakdowns. Maintenance provisions under Indian law, including Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Muslim Women Act, are intended to offer financial protection and are judicially enforceable. Allowing religious edicts to interfere with or supersede these rights would undermine both the intent and effectiveness of these protections.
The Supreme Court’s clear articulation that religious rulings are non-binding within the secular legal framework strengthens the architecture of rights-based adjudication. It fortifies the premise that while personal faith is respected, the administration of justice must remain firmly grounded in the Constitution and statutory law.
Legal scholars have pointed out that while the practice of issuing fatwas or religious opinions may continue within communities, their influence must always be contingent upon voluntary acceptance. Any move towards enforcing such pronouncements against an unwilling party would not only be legally void but also constitutionally impermissible.
The case serves as a strong reminder that informal adjudication, though possibly rooted in tradition, cannot displace the rights and remedies available under the formal judicial system. The Supreme Court’s approach reinforces the idea that religious identity, however central it may be to personal life, cannot become a tool for circumventing constitutional obligations or denying justice to vulnerable sections of society.
