By Bhasha Singh
New defence partnerships are emerging across the world. Their purpose is not merely to strengthen military capabilities but also to reduce dependence on other countries for weapons production and technology. On October 21, Türkiye, Pakistan, Indonesia and Qatar signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding in Doha, the capital of Qatar. Under this agreement, the four countries will jointly manufacture military equipment, share technology and promote defence research. Earlier, in August, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a collective defence agreement in Mecca. Türkiye and Pakistan are parties to both agreements. The question is: what implications could these new partnerships have for India and global politics?
To understand these developments, it is important to recall the events of 2017. Saudi Arabia and three other countries imposed a blockade on Qatar. Türkiye supported Qatar and strengthened its military presence there. However, relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar began to normalise in 2021. Today, both countries are developing stronger defence ties with Türkiye and Pakistan. This shows how old rivalries and new partnerships can coexist in international politics.
There is a fundamental difference between the Mecca and Badr agreements. The Mecca agreement concerns collective security. Under its provisions, an armed attack on any one member would be considered an attack on all three. The Badr agreement, on the other hand, focuses on weapons manufacturing, technology sharing and defence research. It does not impose any obligation for collective military action. It would therefore be incorrect to treat the two agreements as parts of a single military alliance.
These agreements can also be seen as attempts to reduce dependence on the American security framework and Western weapons. The United States has played a major role in the security of Gulf countries for decades. Many countries also depend on Western suppliers for advanced fighter aircraft, missile defence systems and other military technologies. However, regional conflicts and uncertainties surrounding arms supplies have encouraged these countries to explore alternatives. This does not mean that they are severing ties with the United States. Türkiye remains a NATO member, while Qatar hosts a major American military base. These countries are seeking to strengthen their own defence manufacturing capabilities while maintaining security cooperation with Washington.
For India, these developments present an interesting situation and raise several questions. India enjoys strong economic and strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Indonesia. Saudi Arabia is an important partner in energy and trade, while Qatar is a major supplier of natural gas. India’s defence cooperation with Indonesia has also been growing. The two countries have been developing cooperation in areas including the BrahMos missile system and joint defence production.
Indonesia is now part of the same Badr agreement as Pakistan. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has entered into a collective defence agreement with Pakistan. However, it would be wrong to conclude that these countries have joined a front against India. They have their own interests and longstanding relationships with New Delhi.
Nevertheless, some important questions remain. Which countries will gain access to technologies developed through joint defence research? Could sensitive technology obtained by one member be transferred to another? And how would Saudi Arabia interpret its defence commitments in the event of tensions between India and Pakistan? For now, there are no clear answers to these questions.
The world is moving away from the rigid two-bloc structure that characterised the Cold War. Countries are maintaining security cooperation with the United States while trading with China and developing defence manufacturing partnerships with other nations. Agreements such as those signed in Mecca and Doha reflect these changing relationships. However, it remains to be seen how much actual military and technological capability these arrangements will produce.
For India, there appears to be no immediate direct threat. Yet these changing defence relationships cannot be ignored. India will need to strengthen ties with its partners while placing greater emphasis on defence research, indigenous technology and domestic weapons production. Ultimately, the question is not simply who stands with whom. It is also about who will control military technology, arms production and security decisions in the years ahead. (IPA Service)
