By Subrata Majumder
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s upcoming visit to India, starting March 20, 2023, has been engulfed by controversy, after Japan refused to send its Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi to the G-20 summit held in New Delhi on March 3, 2023 under India’s presidency. His paradoxical googly, first, not sending the Foreign Minister to the G-20 summit, and, second, visiting India himself within two weeks of the summit, has spurred surprises and raised eyebrows in the diplomatic circles, especially the pro-Japanese eager to further Indo-Japan relations in the period following the assassination of former premier Mr. Shinzo Abe. Mr. Abe’s personal bond with Prime Minister Narendra Modi had helped elevate India’s hopes for Japan’s strong support for India’s new role in the world. Even though Mr. Kishida has been known to have been handpicked by Shinzo Abe as a potent successor to strengthen his legacy, much of the work was undone since the assassination of Abe.
Mr. Kishida’s last visit to India as the Prime Minister of Japan in early 2022 drew despair among the pro-Japan circuit in the diplomatic echelons. Even though his commitment for big increase in Japanese aid, from US $ 33 billion to US $ 42 billion over the next five year, enchanted Indian policy makers, it failed to enthuse the corporate sector, since it remained silent on Japanese investment in India.
Till Abe’s Prime Minister-ship, the longest serving Japanese Prime Minister, Japan-India relations made a great leap in mutual economic engagement and financial assistance to improve India’s infrastructure. Abe’s vie for Japan’s global power play and reliance on partnership with India for diversified multilateral dynamism, including flexing political muscles for counterweight to China, brought the two nations into a close embrace.
The Abe era of Japan-India relations witnessed a paradigm shift from mere bilateral economic relation to special strategic ties, including defence and global partnership. The relations extended to joint partnership for economic development in third countries, development of the AAGC project (Asia-Africa Growth Corridor), joint cooperation for the development of Chabahar port in Iran, strengthening of defence cooperation for national security with MoUs, among other arenas that demonstrated a new dimension in political and economic ties between Tokyo and New Delhi. The new era provided opportunities to give a strong spine to India-Japan special strategic and global partnership in the sensitive area of geopolitical security.
Abe’s foreign policy harped on combating China’s rise in power in the geopolitical landscape by increasing self-defense of Japan, engulfed by risker nations, like China, Russia and North Korea. Abe also carved out an active role for freedom in Indo-Pacific region with likeminded democracies. He relied on India for balancing power in the Indo-Pacific region. In his book Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan (2007), he advocated strong partnership with India.
Can Mr. Kishida accelerate Abe’s legacy to suit the current realities of Japan-India relations, characterized by the onset of a triangular global leadership, which is steered by a reinvigorated Russia-China alliance, the US-led West and countries like India opting for strategic neutrality? During his maiden visit to USA in March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida said, “Tokyo will further enhance Japan-India Special Strategic Global Partnership in order to strengthen Washington Indo-Pacific strategic framework,” sending a strong message to China.
Abe’s legacy is currently caught between divergent interpretations. To the supporters, he was realistic. He wanted to build a strong Japan, which can protect Japanese people and culture, surrounded by tough neighbourhoods. To his critics, he was obsessed with autocratic democratic power, which let him violate democratic norms and deny the unsavoury chapters of Japan’s imperial colonialism (including war crimes, comfort women).
For India, Japanese investment has been crucial for recent periods of industrialization and Abenomics became the new template for the trigger. It placed India in the global map for automobile industry, transforming Indian manufacturing in technology-oriented sectors and supply chain dynamism. During the Abe regime (2012-2020), Japanese investment saw a whopping growth in India, increasing by more than double, from US $ 2,802 million in 2012 to US$ 4,569 million in 2020.
In contrast, Japanese investment in China declined during the Abe regime. It slipped from US $ 13,479 million in 2012 to US$ 12,088 million in 2021. According to Global Times, a Chinese premium media, there is a catchphrase: “Any loss to China, is a gain to India.”
However, with the end of Abe regime, Japanese investment in India declined. In 2021, Japanese investment declined by 24.4 percent. This was despite the fact that Japanese overall investment in overseas increased in 2021.This leaves no room for arguments making the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse to explain the fall in investment in India, according to Japan observers.
Nevertheless, the fall in Japanese investment in India should not be taken as an example of any downturn in Tokyo’s sentiment towards New Delhi. The euphoria for investment in India continues to flourish. According to latest JBIC survey in 2022, (an overseas business operation by Japanese manufacturers) India topped among the investment destinations for Japanese preferences in the next three years. It outsmarted China, displacing Beijing to second rank for Japanese preferences. The spur in Japanese sentiment could be due to India’s economic bounce-back to assume its rightful position among the top economies of the world, as well as India’s relative success in addressing the Covid pandemic, which left many national economies in a tailspin.
In sum, it will be keenly observed how well Mr. Kishida steps into the hallowed shoes of Shinzo Abe, carrying forward his legacy and ultimate objective of strengthening Japan’s defence capabilities and cementing strategic partnership with likeminded democracies to counter China. It’s needless to reiterate that India will likely play an active role in realising Japan’s ambitions. (IPA Service)
