By T N Ashok
NEW YORK: The central question on the controversial U.S. national G.S. Pannun issue is a difficult one of sovereignty, accountability and the limits of American judicial power: can a US court summon India’s national security leadership over allegations made by a Sikh separatist, and can New Delhi reject that process as an unacceptable intrusion into its internal affairs?
The answer requires a distinction between a petitioner’s allegations, a court’s procedural decision and the Indian government’s diplomatic response. A summons is not a finding of guilt, and a government’s rejection of a summons does not, by itself, dispose of the underlying allegations.
A legal confrontation between India and the United States has reopened one of the most sensitive debates in international relations: the collision between a country’s sovereign right to protect its national security and another country’s determination to investigate alleged crimes committed on its own soil.
On November 10, 2026, India emphatically rejected a civil lawsuit brought by Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a US-based Sikh separatist leader, against National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) chief Samant Goel and other defendants. The lawsuit alleges a conspiracy to assassinate Pannun in the United States. India has denounced the allegations and challenged the method proposed for serving legal documents on its senior officials.
The immediate trigger was a November 9 order by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, permitting Pannun to pursue service of summons on Doval and Goel through designated courts in Delhi. The court directed him to submit the proposed service documents by November 30 before the clerk could transmit them. This was a procedural ruling, not a judgment establishing the truth of the allegations or the defendants’ liability.
India’s objection is therefore twofold: it disputes the substance of the accusations and insists that foreign judicial documents must be handled through the proper Indian authority. Yet the case cannot be dismissed as a mere diplomatic irritant. It concerns allegations of a planned killing on American soil, a matter that falls squarely within the legitimate concern of US law enforcement.
Pannun, legal counsel for the organisation Sikhs for Justice (SFJ), filed the civil lawsuit in September 2024. It names the Government of India, Doval, Goel, former R&AW operative Vikash Yadav, Indian national Nikhil Gupta and approximately 50 unnamed defendants.
The central allegation is that individuals connected to the Indian state conspired to kill Pannun in New York in retaliation for his advocacy of an independent Sikh state called Khalistan. Pannun seeks civil accountability and damages. These remain allegations in the civil action, not findings against every named defendant.
In November 2023, US federal prosecutors announced charges against Gupta over an alleged murder-for-hire conspiracy targeting a US-based Sikh separatist. The prosecution alleged that Gupta worked with an individual described as an Indian government employee. A subsequent indictment identified Yadav as an alleged participant in the scheme. Gupta pleaded guilty in February 2026, according to reporting on the proceedings.
That development strengthens the argument that American authorities have a legitimate reason to investigate the alleged conspiracy. But it does not automatically prove that Doval, Goel or the Indian government authorised the operation. Responsibility must be established separately for each defendant, through admissible evidence and applicable law.
India’s position rests on a fundamental principle: a foreign court cannot simply assume that its procedures override the legal arrangements of another sovereign state. The Ministry of Law and Justice is India’s designated central authority for relevant requests. New Delhi argues that foreign judicial documents must pass through that channel rather than reach senior officials by a route it disputes.
The government also has an obvious national-security concern. The NSA coordinates security policy at the highest level, while R&AW conducts external intelligence operations. Allegations against such officials can expose sensitive institutions to international scrutiny, complicate intelligence cooperation and create diplomatic costs even before a case reaches trial.
But India’s objection needs to be distinguished from a claim that American courts have no authority whatsoever to examine alleged criminal conduct in the United States. Sovereignty is not an automatic exemption from another country’s laws when conduct within that country’s territory is credibly alleged.
What exactly did the American court decide? The distinction between a summons and a judgment is crucial. Judge Katherine Polk Failla did not rule that Doval or Goel had plotted an assassination. Nor did she decide that the lawsuit had overcome every possible defence based on jurisdiction or immunity.
Instead, the November 9 order permitted Pannun to pursue service through Indian courts under Article 19 of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents. The court relied on provisions of India’s Code of Civil Procedure, including Section 29(c), and a 2009 Indian notification extending the relevant mechanism to civil courts in countries party to the convention.
The irony is significant: the court’s reasoning relied partly on Indian law to identify a route for transmitting foreign judicial documents through India’s own courts.
Pannun must submit a proposed packet by November 30, after which the US court will examine the materials before authorising transmission. The procedural step does not establish that the documents have already been validly served on Doval and Goel.
Earlier efforts to serve the officials through other routes had failed. The court had also rejected proposals involving email service on India’s attorney general and other alternative methods. It accepted the State Department’s position that diplomatic service under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was unavailable for the individual officials through the route previously proposed. The latest order therefore represents a narrower legal development than the political language surrounding it might suggest.
The official US position also requires care in interpretation. The State Department indicated that transmission of documents did not express a view on the merits of the allegations, the defendants’ status, the validity of service or the available defences. It was not taking the plaintiff’s side merely by facilitating the process. That qualification matters enormously. A government transmitting court papers is not necessarily endorsing the claims they contain.
The strongest argument in India’s favour is that international judicial authority must have boundaries. A US court cannot exercise unlimited jurisdiction over foreign officials merely because a plaintiff resides in America or alleges wrongdoing by a foreign government. Jurisdiction, valid service of process, sovereign immunity and the official nature of the alleged conduct all require careful examination.
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act generally governs when foreign states can be sued in American courts, subject to statutory exceptions. Individual officials raise distinct questions of immunity, particularly when alleged conduct is connected to their official responsibilities. Whether any immunity applies here is a matter for legal determination, not diplomatic declaration.
The United States has not declared Doval or Goel guilty. Its court has permitted a procedural route for transmitting legal documents. That is materially different from ordering their arrest, compelling them to appear personally or finding that India sponsored an assassination attempt.
Indeed, the court’s reliance on Indian procedural law weakens the argument that its decision is simply an assertion of American supremacy. The question is whether the proposed route is legally available, not whether India must accept the plaintiff’s accusations.
There is also a political dimension. A lawsuit against India’s national security leadership inevitably attracts international attention and puts diplomatic pressure on New Delhi. Pannun’s advocacy of Khalistan and his conflict with the Indian state give the litigation a political context that cannot be ignored.
The immediate test is likely to be procedural. Pannun must submit the proposed documents by November 30, and the US court must determine whether the papers can be transmitted through the proposed route. India may contest the process and invoke whatever jurisdictional and immunity-based defences are available.
New Delhi should not confuse rejecting the allegations with making the litigation disappear. A diplomatic statement cannot, by itself, extinguish proceedings in a foreign court. Nor does the American court’s procedural order compel India to concede that the allegations are true.
The wider consequences could be more significant. India and the United States cooperate in defence, intelligence, counterterrorism and the Indo-Pacific. Neither country benefits from allowing a contentious lawsuit to become a proxy battle over the legitimacy of the other’s institutions.
Washington must demonstrate that its judicial process is governed by law rather than geopolitical convenience. New Delhi must demonstrate that its insistence on sovereignty is compatible with credible accountability when alleged violence crosses international borders.
The two governments should keep diplomatic communication open while allowing legal questions to be resolved through appropriate channels. Any evidence of wrongdoing should be examined rigorously; any attempt to impose liability without sufficient evidence should be resisted.
The Pannun case presents no easy choice between an innocent India and an overreaching America, or between a courageous plaintiff and an infallible government. It presents a test of institutions.
India is entitled to defend its sovereignty, protect legitimate intelligence operations and challenge procedures it believes violate its legal rights. The United States is entitled to investigate alleged criminal conspiracies on its soil and to provide a judicial forum where its laws permit.
Neither entitlement is absolute. If the allegations against Indian officials cannot be substantiated, the legal process should establish that outcome. If credible evidence implicates individuals, their official positions should not automatically prevent lawful scrutiny. Conversely, a procedural order authorising service of summons must never be presented as proof of an assassination conspiracy.
The ultimate question is not whether America can embarrass India or whether India can rebuff America. It is whether both democracies can uphold the rule of law without turning it into an instrument of national pride.
For India, the strongest defence is not simply to denounce the lawsuit as malicious, but to contest it through legally sustainable arguments while defending its security interests. For the United States, the strongest case is not to project judicial power indiscriminately, but to demonstrate that every step follows established law.
In the end, sovereignty deserves respect, but it cannot settle every question of accountability. Equally, the pursuit of justice deserves protection, but it cannot justify unlimited jurisdiction. The credibility of both nations will depend on whether they can maintain that distinction. (IPA Service)
