By T N Ashok
NEW YORK: The Democrats may have won a decisive political mandate in the November 2026 midterms, but they have not won the power to govern America from the White House. With two years remaining in his presidency, Donald Trump can continue to shape trade, immigration, foreign policy and the lives of millions seeking visas or permanent residency. The danger is that a president confronting a hostile Congress may become more confrontational, not less.
The central paradox of the November 3 midterm elections is that voters can weaken a president without being able to stop him immediately. Even if Democrats have taken control of both chambers of Congress, Trump remains President of the United States until January 2029. He retains the executive authority, command of the armed forces and considerable discretion over immigration enforcement, trade policy and the conduct of foreign affairs.
The election changes the political landscape. It does not automatically change the policies that provoked the backlash. For millions of Americans struggling with the cost of living, businesses facing higher import costs, immigrants caught in an uncertain visa system and families awaiting green cards, the immediate question is not who won the election. It is whether anything will change in their lives before the next presidential election. The answer is complicated—and potentially troubling.
The most consequential change is institutional. Democrats’ takeover of the House and Senate means Trump can no longer count on a Republican-controlled Congress to support his legislative agenda without resistance. The election has created a divided government for the final two years of his presidency.
But Congress is not the presidency. Trump can veto bills he opposes, issue executive orders within his legal authority, direct federal agencies and continue pursuing policies that do not require fresh legislation.
Democrats will therefore face a difficult choice: concentrate on reversing policies, investigating the administration, or preventing new restrictions from being imposed. They will probably have to do all three, but with limited time and political capital.
Congressional hearings can expose wrongdoing. Subpoenas can compel evidence, subject to legal challenges. Appropriations can constrain government programmes. Legislation can reverse policies when it passes both chambers and survives a presidential veto—or when Congress has enough votes to override one. None of these tools guarantees immediate relief.
Trump’s tariff policy illustrates the limits of the Democratic victory. Tariffs are central to his economic nationalism: they are intended to pressure foreign governments, encourage domestic manufacturing and demonstrate that Washington will use access to the American market as leverage.
But tariffs can also raise the cost of imported components, machinery and consumer goods. American manufacturers that depend on overseas supplies may face higher production costs, which can eventually reach consumers through higher prices.
The midterm results have increased pressure on the administration to reconsider this approach. Yet Democrats cannot assume that a congressional majority can simply repeal every tariff. The president has access to several statutory trade authorities, and the courts can determine whether particular measures exceed the powers Congress has delegated.
Democrats can investigate the economic consequences, challenge particular measures through legislation, scrutinise trade agreements and pressure Republicans to support changes. They can also make tariff policy a central issue in the debate over household affordability.
The difficulty is that Trump may regard retreat as political defeat. If he believes tariffs define his economic legacy, he could continue using the trade powers available to him, even as Democrats seek to make their costs a defining issue in the final two years.
The war with Iran presents a different challenge because the consequences extend beyond domestic politics. The conflict has contributed to higher energy prices, intensified economic anxiety and helped fuel the backlash against the administration, according to post-election reporting.
Democrats can demand briefings, investigate the decision to enter the war, question the administration’s objectives and press for a timetable to end American military involvement. Congress also possesses constitutional powers over appropriations and war authorisation.
But there is a substantial difference between demanding an end to a war and compelling the president to bring it to an end. Restrictions on funding or military operations would face legislative, political and potentially legal obstacles. A presidential veto could frustrate efforts to impose binding limits.
The danger is that an embattled president might double down, presenting resistance from Congress as an attempt to undermine national security. That would deepen partisan conflict precisely when the country needs clarity about the war’s objectives, its financial costs and the conditions for peace.
It is not inevitable that Trump will escalate the conflict because of the election. But a hostile Congress makes transparency, oversight and clearly defined limits on military action more urgent.
For immigrants, foreign professionals, international students and families awaiting permanent residency, the election may produce a particularly frustrating result: a change in congressional power without an immediate change in immigration policy.
The administration can continue enforcing immigration laws, prioritising deportations, implementing visa rules and directing agencies within the limits of existing statutes and judicial decisions. Some changes require formal rulemaking; others may depend on presidential proclamations or agency guidance. Their legal foundations differ, and each must be examined separately.
The same applies to H-1B visa restrictions and green-card processing. A Democratic Congress cannot automatically cancel an existing proclamation, restore a suspended application category or instruct immigration officials to approve every pending case. The outcome depends on the legal authority behind each restriction and the available remedies.
Democrats nevertheless have meaningful options: Demand explanations for delays, denials and changes in visa processing, and investigate whether rules are being applied consistently. Propose changes to employment-based immigration, visa fees, permanent-residency rules and family immigration, although enactment may be difficult. Scrutinise the resources allocated to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection and US Citizenship and Immigration Services. Support lawful challenges where policies allegedly violate statutory requirements or constitutional protections.
For those awaiting green cards, the immediate concern is that prolonged uncertainty affects employment, travel, family planning and financial security. Congressional hearings may expose the problem, but they will not necessarily shorten a waiting list or reverse a particular decision.
The administration’s actions will continue to matter until policies are changed, blocked by courts or replaced by a subsequent administration.
This is the most provocative question—and the one that deserves careful treatment. Trump cannot seek another elected presidential term under the Twenty-second Amendment, which limits a person to being elected president twice. He is therefore not campaigning for re-election in 2028 in the ordinary sense.
The loss of Congress could encourage two opposite responses. Trump might moderate some policies to avoid further electoral damage. Alternatively, he might use executive powers more aggressively, portraying congressional opposition as obstruction and trying to accomplish as much as possible before January 2029.
There is already a basis for concern: Reuters reported before the election that the White House had been preparing additional executive actions on immigration, tariffs and other policy areas in anticipation of a Democratic congressional takeover.
That preparation suggests the administration understands the constraints ahead. It does not prove that every planned measure will be implemented or that Trump will inevitably become more extreme.
The more serious institutional risk is that confrontation becomes the governing strategy: executive action followed by litigation, congressional investigation followed by presidential resistance, and policy uncertainty that lasts until the next administration.
Democrats must avoid promising that winning Congress will quickly undo every policy voters rejected. Their more credible strategy would be to establish priorities, use oversight aggressively and seek legislative victories where bipartisan support exists.
They can investigate the costs and consequences of tariffs, demand accountability for the Iran war, scrutinise immigration restrictions, protect congressional spending powers and challenge unlawful executive action. They can also make affordability the measure against which the administration’s performance is judged.
Their greatest weapon may ultimately be political rather than legislative. By documenting the consequences of administration policies and offering workable alternatives, Democrats can demonstrate that the election represented more than a protest vote.
But their own divisions could weaken that opportunity. If they become consumed by investigations and partisan spectacle without producing tangible results, voters may conclude that the change in congressional control has made little difference.
The November midterms have altered Washington’s balance of power, but they have not transferred the presidency. Trump retains substantial authority over trade, immigration and foreign policy, although that authority is neither unlimited nor immune from judicial review or congressional action.
For Americans struggling with higher prices, immigrants waiting for permanent residency and businesses caught between tariffs and supply-chain pressures, the immediate future may therefore remain uncertain.
The next two years could bring a sustained contest between presidential power and congressional oversight. Trump may become more combative, or he may negotiate selectively when political costs become too high. Democrats may block some initiatives, expose others and secure changes in particular areas, but they cannot promise an overnight reversal of the administration’s agenda.
The real test of the midterm victory is not how thoroughly Democrats can condemn Trump. It is how effectively they can protect congressional authority, enforce legal limits and deliver practical relief before the next presidential election.
That is the paradox of the final two years: a president weakened at the ballot box can remain powerful in office—and a victorious opposition can discover that winning control of Congress is only the beginning of the struggle. (IPA Service)
