By Asad Mirza
Manila hosts the Quad leaders’ gathering and ASEAN-linked diplomacy this week; while the APEC convenes separately in Shenzhen, China. Both meetings link alliance reassurance to great-power bargaining, but should not blur their distinct purposes. A three-way meeting of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin may command headlines, while India must defend substance.
The most dramatic event of the week is scheduled for Shenzhen, where US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin are due to meet on November 19. Beijing says the leaders will discuss safeguarding world peace and promoting strategic stability. Trump has signalled interest in nuclear-arms reduction; China has traditionally argued that Washington and Moscow should reduce their much larger arsenals before Beijing joins such talks.
The setting invites grand comparisons, but a historic photograph is not a settlement. The three leaders have overlapping interests in avoiding uncontrolled escalation, yet, sharply different aims. Putin gains stature from sitting alongside the US and Chinese presidents. Xi can present China as a convener of major-power dialogue. Trump can claim a high-profile diplomatic role. Those incentives may produce carefully managed language, but they do not themselves resolve conflicts or create shared rules.
Ukraine is a particularly revealing test. Reporting before the meeting suggested that Xi was wary of allowing the trilateral to become a forum for negotiating a European war without Europeans or Ukraine present. US officials have indicated that Trump may focus on nuclear issues and Iran, rather than Ukraine. Even if the war is raised, any durable arrangement affecting Ukraine’s sovereignty cannot credibly be made over Kyiv’s head.
Expect discussion, choreography and possibly a commitment to keep talking, not a dependable “new Yalta”. The analogy overstates the three leaders’ ability to divide the world or compel others to accept their decisions. Europe, Ukraine and Indo-Pacific states are not passive pieces on a board. Moreover, the three powers do not share a unified strategy: a meeting can manage friction, but it cannot erase their competition or reconcile their conflicting interests.
The danger is that the spectacle will eclipse APEC’s central purpose: economic cooperation across the Asia-Pacific. APEC provides a venue for discussing trade, investment and regional growth among economies with differing political systems. But a summit dominated by three leaders’ strategic drama could turn the forum into a backdrop for bilateral and trilateral bargaining. Other members will be watching for signs that Washington and Beijing might make deals affecting trade or security without consulting them.
There is also a practical limit to what a leaders’ encounter on the margins can achieve. Brookings notes that a Trump-Xi side meeting would be shorter than a dedicated summit, constraining detailed negotiation; the existing trade truce, extended until January 2027, also reduces pressure for an immediate breakthrough. APEC’s value may therefore, lie less in a grand bargain than in preserving channels and preventing a bilateral rivalry from destabilising regional commerce.
For Trump, the Manila meeting serves two purposes: demonstrating engagement with Indo-Pacific partners while retaining room for direct dealings with Xi and Putin. That dual track is not inherently contradictory. The problem is credibility. If the Quad is described as a “partnership of action”, partners will look for concrete follow-through, not only a meeting and carefully worded assurances. Recent trade disputes and doubts about Washington’s consistency have heightened scrutiny in New Delhi and other capitals.
The likely deliverables, cooperation on critical minerals, maritime security and economic resilience, are sensible precisely because they can be advanced without turning the Quad into a military alliance or demanding that members sever ties with China. But declarations will count for little unless they lead to practical coordination: more resilient supply chains, maritime information-sharing, infrastructure investment and trusted technology partnerships. The Quad’s credibility will depend on whether its members can sustain that work after the leaders leave Manila.
India should neither treat the trilateral as a settled new order nor dismiss it as theatre. The meeting could ease tensions, but it could also normalise a great-power habit of discussing regional security in a small club. New Delhi’s response should be to insist, through diplomacy, that decisions affecting Ukraine require Ukraine’s participation, and that Indo-Pacific stability requires consultation with the states most directly exposed to it. Strategic autonomy is not silence; it is the ability to engage without surrendering independent judgement.
At the Quad, India can turn that principle into an agenda. It should press for specific, deliverable cooperation on maritime domain awareness, critical-mineral supply chains, clean energy, resilient infrastructure and disaster preparedness. These are areas where the four countries can build capacity while producing benefits for Southeast Asia. India should also make clear that the Quad must complement, not bypass, ASEAN-led regional processes. A durable Indo-Pacific framework will need the consent and participation of the region, not merely solidarity among four partners.
In Manila, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to join US President Donald Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for the first Quad leaders’ meeting in two years. The leaders are expected to discuss Indo-Pacific peace, prosperity and security, with maritime security, energy and economic resilience among the likely priorities. Modi is also attending the ASEAN-India Summit and the East Asia Summit, giving India a broader regional platform beyond the Quad.
A Modi-Trump conversation would be especially consequential because it can address strains in the bilateral relationship directly, while the Quad offers a wider framework in which both sides can demonstrate cooperation. Still, India should avoid making the grouping a referendum on its relationship with Washington, or a platform for performative confrontation with Beijing. The strongest Indian role is to keep the Quad practical, inclusive in its regional approach and resilient to shifts in US priorities.
The week’s image may be Trump moving from Quad partners in Manila to Xi and Putin in Shenzhen. India’s task is to ensure that neither the photo-op nor the power politics substitutes for regional agency. The Quad’s test is useful cooperation; APEC’s, economic dialogue; and the trilateral’s, whether it can reduce risk without pretending three leaders can settle the world’s conflicts alone. (IPA Service)
