Tensions sparked by the Pahalgam terror attack have escalated into a protracted aviation standoff in which Pakistan’s decision to bar Indian-registered aircraft from its airspace is inflicting greater losses on itself than on India. Islamabad’s move has done more than make headlines; it is damaging Pakistan’s aviation revenue and revealing the limits of its bargaining power.
Pakistan’s ban, imposed in late April and repeatedly extended via Notices to Airmen, covers all Indian-owned, operated or leased aircraft, including military flights. India responded with its own reciprocal closure. The effect on Pakistan’s aviation sector is mounting. Between 24 April and 30 June, the Pakistan Airports Authority reported over Rs 1,240 crore in lost overflight fee revenue. Daily transit traffic through Pakistan’s skies dropped by nearly 20 percent, with about 100 to 150 fewer Indian overflights each day.
For India, the disruption is real but manageable. The airspace ban affects roughly 800 weekly flights operated by Indian carriers travelling from North India to destinations in West Asia, Europe, the UK and North America. Indian airlines are rerouting via the Arabian Sea and circumventing Pakistan by way of Iran, Oman or other neighbouring airspace. These detours add between 15 minutes to several hours per flight, depending on route and destination.
Air India has warned of annual additional costs of about $600 million if the ban stays in place for a full year. Unlike 2019’s closure, when losses were estimated at ₹700 crore for Indian carriers, current financial strains appear more evenly balanced but tilt against Pakistan.
The scale of impact hinges on structural differences. India’s aviation sector has multiple carriers operating extensive westbound routes. Air India, IndiGo, Air India Express, Akasa Air and SpiceJet are all affected. Pakistan’s main carrier, Pakistan International Airlines, runs about six weekly flights over Indian airspace—primarily between Kuala Lumpur and Lahore or Islamabad. The strategic costs to Pakistan include lost overflight income and long-term reputational damage as an unreliable transit country.
Airline executives note that longer routes increase not just fuel spend, but also crew scheduling complexity, maintenance hours and administrative load. Narrow-bodied aircraft like those of IndiGo cannot operate some longer routes, forcing suspensions of flights to destinations like Tashkent or Almaty. Even nonstop services between India and North America now require fuel stops in Europe, adding hours to the journey.
Despite the disruption, India retains a strategic advantage. Pakistan’s airspace ban was intended as a show of strength following the attack, but its economic impact undercuts that objective. The airspace over Pakistan remains open to international carriers not deemed Indian, insulating Pakistan somewhat from isolation. Pakistan’s options to counterbalance are limited; its airline sector lacks the breadth of networks to reciprocate meaningfully.
International carriers have taken side interest. Airlines such as Lufthansa and Air France are now avoiding Pakistani airspace altogether, prioritising to reduce risk amid political instability. These reroutes deprive Pakistan of overflight fees from third-party carriers, deepening its revenue shortfall.
For India, managing the fallout means cost containment and adjustments. Some carriers have appealed for government subsidy or tax relief, citing the burden of extended flights. Indian aviation regulators and airlines are recalibrating operations mid-crisis—a delicate exercise in preserving service continuity while absorbing losses.
Erdogan Re-urges Kashmir Resolution at UNGA 