By T N Ashok
NEW YORK: Donald Trump retains the presidency and executive authority, but a Democratic-controlled House and Senate could fundamentally change the political calculations governing trade, tariffs, immigration and America’s strategic engagement with India. For New Delhi, the opportunity is real, but so are the risks.
The political landscape in Washington has changed dramatically following the November 3, 2026, midterm elections. President Donald Trump remains in the White House, but the Republicans have lost control of both chambers of Congress to the Democrats. The result is a divided government in which the president continues to exercise executive power while the legislative branch is controlled by an opposition party.
This is more than an electoral setback for Trump. It changes the institutional balance of power in Washington and introduces a new dimension into India’s relationship with the United States.
For New Delhi, the immediate question is whether a Democratic-controlled Congress will provide relief from the punitive trade policies and tariff uncertainties associated with Trump’s administration, or whether it will create another layer of political and legislative complications in an already difficult bilateral relationship.
The answer is not straightforward. A divided Washington could offer India greater negotiating space, but it will not automatically dismantle Trump’s tariff policies. Nor does a Democratic majority necessarily translate into a more accommodating American position on immigration, market access or India’s strategic autonomy.
India will have to conduct diplomacy on two fronts: the White House, which controls the executive machinery of American foreign policy, and Capitol Hill, which holds considerable authority over trade legislation, government expenditure, immigration laws and congressional oversight.
The scale of the Democratic victory is significant. Democrats control both chambers, with the party having secured a substantial House majority with 54 Senate seats. The final tallies remain subject to outstanding counts and certification, but the transfer of congressional control is clear. The Senate result includes independents who caucus with Democrats.
The shift extends beyond Washington. The National Conference of State Legislatures reported on November 5 that Democrats held 28 governorships, with Democratic candidates leading in two outstanding contests. Subsequent projections put the emerging balance at 30 Democratic governors and 20 Republican governors. These figures should be distinguished from the number of state legislatures controlled by each party: a governor’s party does not automatically control the state legislature.
The result is a more complicated political environment for Trump. Democrats will be able to control congressional committees, set much of the legislative agenda, investigate administration decisions and block bills they oppose. Senate control will also give them greater influence over nominations and the scheduling of legislative business.
But a divided government is not the same as a powerless presidency. Trump retains the executive branch, the authority to conduct diplomacy and substantial powers over trade, subject to the limits imposed by federal law and the courts. Republicans can still support him on selected issues, and Democrats will not necessarily agree among themselves on every trade or foreign-policy question.
Major legislation will become harder to pass. Democrats cannot simply enact their preferred policies over a presidential veto, which generally requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override. The likely consequence is a period of bargaining, investigations and selective confrontation rather than an automatic reversal of the administration’s policies.
For India, that distinction is fundamental. Congress can make Trump’s policies more difficult to sustain politically and administratively, but it cannot independently negotiate a new tariff schedule with New Delhi or direct the president to abandon every measure imposed under existing statutory authority.
The immediate test is the proposed US–India trade agreement. On November 10, Reuters reported that the two governments were continuing negotiations to finalise the first tranche of a bilateral deal. An Indian official said American officials had visited India earlier in November, with discussions focused on customs and trade facilitation.
That is tangible progress, but it must not be mistaken for a completed agreement. The negotiations remain active; the announcement does not establish that the two sides have settled all tariff rates, agreed to a final legal text or secured the domestic approvals needed to implement every provision.
The distinction matters because Indian exporters need predictable market access, not simply encouraging diplomatic statements. Manufacturers making investment decisions, accepting orders or negotiating prices with American buyers must know which duties will apply when their products arrive.
A Democratic Congress could influence the negotiations in several ways. Its committees can question administration officials about the economic consequences of tariffs, demand information on the legal basis for trade measures and examine their impact on American consumers, retailers and manufacturers. Lawmakers representing import-dependent businesses may press for exemptions or a more stable arrangement if tariffs are increasing costs for US companies.
Democrats may also challenge the administration’s use of executive authority, particularly where the legal basis for tariffs is contested. Such scrutiny could strengthen the argument for a negotiated settlement that offers businesses greater certainty.
Yet there is an important counterpoint. Democratic lawmakers have their own constituencies to protect, including American workers, industrial producers, farmers and businesses seeking access to India’s large market. They may support lower tariffs on Indian goods while simultaneously demanding that India reduce its own barriers to American agricultural products, industrial goods, medical technology and digital services.
For Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, the new Washington equation calls for a carefully calibrated strategy.
First, New Delhi must continue negotiating directly with the Trump administration. The president and his executive agencies remain central to tariff decisions and the conduct of trade diplomacy. An agreement cannot be secured by cultivating congressional relationships alone.
Second, India should deepen engagement with the incoming Democratic congressional leadership, relevant committee chairs and lawmakers representing industries affected by the trade relationship. The objective should be to explain the mutual costs of tariff uncertainty, demonstrate India’s contribution to American supply chains and identify areas where reciprocal concessions are commercially viable.
Third, the Indian government must preserve its strategic autonomy. It should neither interpret the Democratic victory as a licence to disregard American concerns nor concede economic or foreign-policy positions merely to secure short-term tariff relief.
Fourth, Indian businesses should accelerate market diversification. The experience of garment manufacturers demonstrates the danger of concentrating exports in one country whose trade policy can change abruptly. The United Kingdom, the European Union, the Middle East and India’s domestic market can all play larger roles, although each brings its own regulatory and competitive challenges.
Finally, New Delhi must distinguish between political opportunity and enforceable policy change. Positive statements from members of Congress may help build momentum, but only concrete decisions, legally sustainable measures and implemented agreements will provide lasting relief to exporters.
The 2026 midterms have produced a significant political constraint on Trump. Democrats now have the opportunity to scrutinise his administration more aggressively, challenge elements of its agenda and demand greater accountability over trade and immigration. The election also strengthens the position of Democratic governors, who may pursue economic and regulatory policies at state level that differ from those of the federal government.
But states cannot independently negotiate America’s international trade agreements or overturn federal tariffs. Their influence is more indirect, operating through local business conditions, investment decisions, procurement, labour markets and political pressure.
For India, the consequences will therefore be mixed. A divided government could create space for more pragmatic trade negotiations and strengthen the case against economically damaging tariffs. It could also introduce delays, additional scrutiny and new demands on market access, immigration and political questions.
The bilateral relationship is too important to be reduced to the fortunes of one party. Defence cooperation and strategic convergence provide a foundation, but commercial relations will require sustained negotiation and political management.
The central lesson for New Delhi is that a Democratic Congress may constrain Trump’s room for manoeuvre, but it cannot guarantee India a better trade deal. India must use the new balance of power to pursue tariff relief, protect skilled-worker mobility and deepen strategic cooperation, while building enough economic resilience to withstand the next turn in American politics.
The measure of success will not be whether Washington’s political balance has changed. It will be whether that change produces a more predictable, reciprocal and durable partnership. (IPA Service)
