By Arun Srivastava
The Janata Dal (United) of Nitish Kumar is facing an acute structural crisis in Bihar, with the party trying to rebalance and prevent disintegration along caste lines. But it does not appear to be working in the long term, even though there might be some temporary relief. In a situation where the caste structure in the state is under intense churning, not only are the EBC or OBC mulling restructuring their support for JDU, even the upper castes like Rajputs and Brahmins are exploring new avenues. In other words, a major caste rearrangement appears to be imminent.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is currently dealing with a delicate internal and external caste balancing act, though the primary friction is not strictly between different upper castes, but rather a collective upper-caste backlash against the party’s broader electoral shift toward Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs). This situation has been created by the skewed handling of caste dynamics by RSS leadership as well as by the BJP high command, namely Narendra Modi and Amit Shah. Savarna (upper caste) voters have formed the foundational bedrock of the BJP’s electoral strength. But after the Bihar assembly elections, the priority of the BJP made a strategic shift. Emergence of a new kind of rural violence was witnessed, of which the prime target remained the Dalits and the EBC.
The Modi government’s concessions towards enumerating caste in the national census and navigating complex sub-categorization for backward communities have alarmed general-category voters. But it would be wrong to construe that it has dumped its upper caste dominance policy and politics, although in Bihar, the BJP top leadership has installed an OBC face, Samrat Chaudhary, as chief minister. This dichotomy of practice and politics ought to be understood in proper perspective.
Like other political parties of centrists and leftists, the BJP is also caught in a vortex, to assess the situation and evolve a long-lasting socio-political strategy. The BJP tries to merge Hindutva with backward-caste outreach, but its deep-rooted Kamandal (anti-reservation) politics resists this sociocultural push. Besides, the BJP’s electoral footprint in Bihar relies heavily on privileged-caste candidates, complicating its appeal to a broader lower-caste demographic. Parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Janata Dal (United) utilize social justice coalitions to counter the BJP’s consolidation strategy. Bihar Caste Survey revealed that Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) form a massive majority, intensifying demands for proportional representation.
Obviously, this transient situation has made the EBC and OBC and also Dalits to explore some other technique for protecting their caste and class interests. There is a palpable shift and restructuring of support among OBC and EBC communities in Bihar, but they are not moving as a single, uniform block. Instead of a wholesale shift, what is happening on the ground is a highly strategic, region-dependent shift toward both the RJD (Rashtriya Janata Dal) and CPI(ML) Liberation, driven by changing social dynamics, localized friction, and new political alignments.
The breakdown of how and why these communities are shifting reveals the following patterns: For the Extremely Backward Castes (EBCs) and Mahadalits facing rural friction or upper-caste high-handedness, CPI(ML) represents a ground-level shield. In areas with a history of agrarian distress and caste-based intimidation (especially in Central Bihar districts like Bhojpur, Arrah, and Siwan), younger EBC and Dalit voters view CPI(ML) as an uncompromising, cadre-based force that fights for dignity and land rights. Historically, many EBCs harboured reservations about the RJD due to past friction with dominant Yadav landowners at the village level. For these voters, CPI(ML) acts as a safer alternative within the broader opposition alliance.
The strategic shift of the restless backward castes toward the RJD is conjured by its caste identity, changing perceptions of power sharing and ticket distribution. Under Tejashwi, the RJD has actively tried to shed its older image as strictly a “Yadav-Muslim” party. By giving a large share of election tickets to non-Yadav OBCs and EBCs, the party has sent a strong message of political inclusion. Following the data released in the Bihar Caste Survey (showing EBCs and OBCs make up over 63% of the state’s population), there is a growing narrative among backward classes that they must vote cohesively to protect their reservation quotas and political representation. When local friction with upper-caste groups peaks, voters frequently consolidate behind RJD as the largest vehicle capable of defeating the ruling coalition.
Nitish Kumar built JD(U) is for empowering EBCs and Mahadalits to counter dominant castes. A loyal section of older EBC voters still sticks with his welfare model, even though his alliance choices have caused restlessness among the youth. EBCs are a highly fragmented cluster of over 100 sub-castes. If a local candidate from RJD or CPI(ML) belongs to a rival sub-caste, EBC voters often split their votes rather than shifting en masse.
Whenever there is a perceived rise in upper-caste assertiveness or violence, the social coalition undergoes a dramatic realignment. Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) frequently move towards parties that anchor their platforms on social justice and anti-feudal resistance. The Rashtriya Janata Dal built its political foundation on the empowerment of backward castes against upper-caste hegemony. For EBCs and OBCs feeling marginalized or threatened, the RJD — especially with its renewed focus on the caste survey results and expanding quotas to 65% — presents itself as a powerful shield capable of leveraging state and electoral machinery.
If EBCs, who have historically been a swing vote courted by various alliances, feel that the ruling dispensation is leaning heavily toward accommodating upper-caste interests, their subsequent restlessness would benefit the opposition Mahagathbandhan (Grand Alliance). But it has not happened in the last assembly election of Bihar as they were carried away by the assurances of Modi and Shah. This has happened in spite of Congress led by Rahul Gandhi being a part of alliance.
Nitish roped in EBC with his own caste brethren Koiri and Kurmis, but it stood at the foundation of pecuniary gains, did not stand on some ideological base. This base has been fragile. The party’s vulnerability stems from a mix of leadership transition and the unique social engineering that originally built it. Moreover, Nitish Kumar stepping down as chief minister under orders from Modi and Shah, simply eroded the confidence level of JDU supporters. Without his singular authority to bind competing factions, individual caste leaders within the party are jockeying for control over its future direction. These leaders who belong to the upper castes, like Bhumihars and Brahmins, don’t enjoy the support and the trust of the JD(U) rank and file. They are merely parasites and depend on Nitish, and now his son Nishant, who’s still a political newbie, for their survival.
The supporters of the party have their caste and class interests and aspire to have these met. With Nitish virtually leading a hermitage life, he cannot be expected to help them. Obviously, the rank and file need to have a stronger leader, especially in a state like Bihar where caste politics dictates the welfare programmes and policies of the government. Unlike opposition parties like the RJD, which commands a massive, cohesive core vote block (Yadavs and Muslims), the JD(U)’s strength is built on a highly scattered coalition. It relies on Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), Mahadalits (the most marginalized Dalit sub-castes), and smaller Other Backward Classes (OBCs) like Kurmis and Koiries. Rival parties are actively trying to slice away pieces of the JD(U)’s base. The RJD and Congress are trying to woo EBC and Dalit voters, while the BJP is seeking a greater direct share of the EBC vote. Furthermore, new independent disruptors like Prashant Kishor’s Jan Suraaj Party are pulling away younger voters across various communities.
The August 2026 Bankipur bypoll victory of Jan Suraaj Party (JSP) founder Prashant Kishor has significantly accelerated political anxieties over the survival of the JD(U). Kishor’s win directly challenges the existing political order in Bihar. The verdict poses a serious, multifaceted threat to the long-term viability of the JD(U). Bankipur bypoll served as the first major electoral test for the NDA since Nitish Kumar stepped down and Samrat Choudhary took over as Chief Minister. The defeat is rejection of this post-Nitish leadership model. Without Nitish Kumar’s direct anchor at the top of the state government, the JD(U)’s identity and voter base are highly vulnerable to splintering.
Under Samrat Choudhary, Bihar has seen eruption of upper-caste violence, and is experiencing intense aggressive policing and alleged caste-biased law enforcement. A number of custodial deaths have taken place in the state. Since Samrat assumed office as Chief Minister in April 2026, police encounters — informally termed “Operation Langda” or half-encounters where suspects are shot in the leg — have spiked across several districts. This has been happening behind the façade of Samrat’s assertion that the state’s priority is swift action against crime and strict adherence to good governance (sushasan) rather than appeasing identity politics.
Recent political rows in Bihar feature claims regarding EBC and OBC in relation to police actions. Opposition leaders from RJD and CPI(ML) have publicly accused the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government of executing “caste-based encounters,” alleging that Bihar Police have selectively targeted individuals from specific backward caste identities during anti-crime crackdowns.
Fear of JD(U) being decimated has forced Nishant, son of Nitish, to open backdoor channel with Tejashwi Yadav. Both maintain a relationship that balances personal warmth with sharp political rivalry. While the two leaders share mutual personal respect—often referring to each other as “brothers” in public—their formal political actions reflect a direct opposition. Both leaders have historically kept their personal remarks courteous. When rumours first surfaced about Nishant Kumar entering Bihar politics, RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav openly welcomed him, stating that Nishant is “like a brother” and that he would be happy to see him serve society. Nishant has similarly reciprocated the “younger brother” sentiment in casual media interactions.
Meanwhile, upper-caste Rajputs and Brahmins maintaining distance from BJP has caused anxiety in the party circle, especially to Modi and Shah. With EBC and OBC already shifting their support, this development has indeed come as a shock. Yet another information that Bihar’s dominant castes, Brahmins and Rajputs, have finally found a political leader in Prashant Kishor has proved to be a nightmare for them. He is more a direct threat to BJP than to RJD, Congress and CPI(ML). (IPA Service)
