By Arun Srivastava
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s trajectory, from its birth in 1980 with the pledge to follow Gandhian socialism to actively pursuing the Politics of Hindutva in 2026, has been quite enigmatic. The party at its first convention on April 6, 1980, had adopted “Gandhian Socialism” as one of its five core guiding principles (Pancha Nishthas). This ideology was intended to distinguish the new party from its predecessor (Bharatiya Jana Sangh) and the Janata Party, aiming for a centrist appeal that blended Gandhian socio-economic principles with Indian traditional values.
But at the early age of five years, the party made a strategic shift to identity itself as a communal outfit with adopting the ideology of Hindutva, particularly after its significant electoral defeat in 1984. The RSS leadership which has been driving force behind formation of BJP had come to realise that a centrist politics and philosophy is not enough to counter the left-centre politics of Congress and obviously for its political survival it needs to pursue a communal and far right politics and philosophy. The RSS leadership, like Nanaji Deshmukh, was absolutely clear that Gandhian Socialism, a socio-economic system designed to create a “samaras samaj” (harmonious society) free from exploitation, emphasizing decentralization and self-reliance was of no use for the BJP.
Yet another factor that made the BJP leadership to change its political line was the deep abhorrence of majority of the RSS leadership towards socialist philosophy. The “socialist” label was unpopular with hardline elements of the RSS and some senior leaders, such as Rajmata Vijayaraje Scindia, who felt it made the party a “photocopy of the Congress”. In the 1984 General Elections, held after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the BJP won only two Lok Sabha seats. This defeat caused the party leadership to conclude that a centrist approach was unsuccessful. Eventually just one year after distancing from Gandhian socialism, the party adopted Deendayal Upadhyaya’s “Integral Humanism” as its foundational philosophy.
The party was set to become avant-garde of communal politics was evident from L K Advani replacing Atal Behari Vajpayee as the President in May 1986. The RSS pursuing its secretive policy attributed the shift to party’s poor performance in the 1984 general elections. It was made public that Advani was party’s new Communal face, the Hindu Hridaya Samrat. Significantly Advani rode Ram Rath and set on Yatra ( ‘Ram chariot journey’) in September 1990 to polarise Hindus.
Installing of Advani witnessed rise of Hardline Hindutva. BJP under Advani adopted a more direct, aggressive Hindutva agenda. Advani buried the principle of Gandhian socialism and brought hardline issues like the Ram Janmabhoomi movement to the center stage. There is no ambiguity that inclusion of “Gandhian Socialism” was a temporary, opportunistic move, rather than a genuine shift in ideology, aimed at navigating the volatile political environment after the Janata Party split.
The party could not make a spectacular gain during UPA rule as it had no philosophical alternative to combat and put an alternative to globalisation and liberalisation. However the saffron leadership continued to push its agenda of Hindutva and cultural nationalism during this period. Nationalisation is a complex political ideology that is often associated with the right-wing of the political spectrum, though not inherently fascist, it is a key component of fascist movements. All fascist movements utilize extreme, often ethno-nationalism. BJP leadership resorted to same tactics.
Nationalism is a belief that a specific nation, often defined by shared culture, language, or history, should be the primary focus of political loyalty and activity. It is strongly associated with the right, particularly in its focus on tradition, order, and in the case of the far-right, ethnocentrism, nativism, and immigration control. Nationalism is often seen in democratic, centrist, or liberal contexts, focusing on national unity without necessarily embracing supremacy.
Nevertheless with Narendra Modi becoming the prime minister in 2014, the nationalism slide into fascism. This happens when intense national pride transforms into exclusionary, myth-driven ideology that prioritizes the state over individual rights through authoritarianism, militarism, and the targeting of scapegoats. It moves from “loving one’s country” to believing that the nation’s survival requires subjugating others and enforcing absolute unity under a charismatic leader. This was clearly visible in RSS and BJP cadres resorting to terrorising Muslims and lynching innocent persons. A vile propaganda was launched against the Muslims. Modi government engages in authoritarian tendencies, such as targeting minority groups (particularly Muslims), restricting dissent, using government agencies against political opponents, and promoting majoritarian politics. Some academics argue this fits a pattern of 21st-century “neofascism”.
Nationalism moves away from shared citizenship and toward an ethnic definition based on blood, soil, language, and tradition, turning nationhood into an exclusive club that marginalizes minorities. Fascism replaces rational political discourse with myths of national superiority and historical glory, demanding blind faith and emotional devotion to the state. Fascism builds unity by identifying internal or external enemies—minorities, left-wingers, or foreigners—blaming them for the nation’s decline. The most important being it creates a cult of leader. A charismatic leader is elevated, promising to fix the country through, (Modi Hai to Mumkin Hai) if necessary, total rejection of democracy and the use of unlimited state violence to enforce obedience. This slide is rarely sudden, often exploiting times of national crisis or economic instability to move from legitimate national interest to authoritarian, fascist ideology.
It is entirely a wrong notion that BJP has an ideology. Integral Humanism and Hindutva do not fall under the traditional, restrictive ambit of “ideology”, particularly Western “isms”. At best it is philosophy, way of life or paradigms rooted in indigenous Indian thought. Proponents, supported by Supreme Court judgments from the 1990s, often define Hindutva as a “way of life,” a “state of mind,” or “cultural nationalism” rather than merely a religious dogma or political ideology. V.D. Savarkar, who coined the term, described it as the comprehensive history of Hindus, defining “Hinduness” based on shared territorial, racial, and cultural bonds (rashtra, jati, sanskriti), rather than religious practice. Many scholars, analysts, and critics categorize Hindutva as a right-wing, majoritarian political philosophy or a form of ethnic nationalism that seeks to transform India into a Hindu state (Hindu Rashtra).
The rightist (right-wing) forces do not have an ideology. They often view social hierarchy, inequality, or traditional structures as natural, desirable, or inevitable. They emphasize the preservation of traditions, cultural continuity, and established institutions. But they champion capitalism, laissez-faire economics, free-market policies, lower taxes, and deregulation, believing that private enterprise is the best driver of economic growth. Modi Raj has accelerated India’s neoliberal shift towards privatization, deregulation, and foreign investment, often described as a “Hindutva variant of neoliberalism” or “authoritarian neoliberalism”. It combines aggressive pro-capital economic policies—favouring big monopolies and infrastructure—with populist welfare measures.
Modi’s rhetoric emphasizes growth and development to distract from social issues, offering modest policy reforms that are marketed as transformative. Under this design top corporations get state support to generate profits, creating extreme wealth concentration. Modi government links Hindu nationalist ideology with economic modernization, selling elite-friendly policies to the masses through nationalistic narratives. Modi Raj is marked by a concentration of power, subversion of institutions, and reduction of labour rights to facilitate investment, a phenomenon sometimes termed “authoritarian neoliberalism”.
For BJP political purity is a distant thought. For transformed BJP, under Modi, electoral gain is the supreme and it must have to be achieved at any cost. Ideology, political identity have no importance when it comes to the issue of winning the election. BJP’s actions represent a shift towards divisive, or right-wing majoritarianism, which lacks a principled, democratic ideology. A fascist organisation does not follow the principle of do and don’t. For it everything is fair. This has primarily been the reason that it allowed entry of most corrupted leaders from other parties.
Modi’s cult status is the primary driver of the BJP’s expansion. Voters often vote for Modi rather than local BJP candidates. Modi is projected as a decisive leader.. He has been exposed. He is no doubt a compromised prime minister having no guts to take tough decisions regarding national security. Under Modi, Hindutva’s rise is inseparable from neoliberal capitalism. BJP-RSS combine fuses market fundamentalism with majoritarian authoritarianism. Upper caste elites support Modi’s Hindutva for preserving social hierarchy. (IPA Service)
