By T N Ashok
After 17 years in London exile, Tarique Rahman is poised to become Bangladesh’s next prime minister following his Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s decisive victory in Thursday’s elections — a watershed moment that ends nearly two decades of political tumult and sets the stage for a complex diplomatic balancing act in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions.
The outcome delivers a mandate to Rahman, 60, the eldest son of BNP founder and former President Ziaur Rahman, who was assassinated in 1981, and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who died recently.
But it also hands him an inheritance few would envy: an economy battered by inflation, a banking sector riddled with non-performing loans, corruption ranked among the worst globally, and a geopolitical tightrope stretching between New Delhi, Beijing, and Washington.
The path to Thursday’s vote began not in parliament but in the streets. A youth-led uprising in August 2024, fuelled by grievances over joblessness and economic stagnation, toppled Hasina in what protesters called Bangladesh’s “second liberation.” The violent revolution claimed up to 1,400 lives according to UN estimates — the worst bloodshed since the 1971 War of Independence.
Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus stepped in to lead an interim government tasked with stabilizing the nation and organizing credible elections. For 18 months, Yunus navigated factional demands, economic crises, and the delicate work of dismantling authoritarian structures built over 15 years of Hasina’s rule. Now, he is expected to begin the formal transition of power within a week.
The election itself defied simple narratives. Pre-election polling from seven major surveys — analyzed by The New York Editorial — projected BNP victory but with significant uncertainty. The party’s support hovered around 42 percent, remarkably consistent with its historical base. Yet the race was complicated by the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party and the BNP’s former ally, which surged from under 10 percent support to as high as 32 percent in some surveys.
Jamaat’s ascendance, driven by victories in student union elections at major universities and appeal among first-time voters, represented what analysts called a potential “political earthquake.” The party, banned under Hasina and whose leaders were executed or disappeared during her tenure, positioned itself as the voice of conservative voters disillusioned with mainstream politics.
Bangladesh’s first-past-the-post electoral system, however, magnified the BNP’s geographically dispersed support while punishing Jamaat’s concentrated regional strongholds. The alliance between BNP and Jamaat fractured during the campaign, with both parties competing directly for votes. Jamaat’s Facebook page contested the results, alleging “repeated inconsistencies and fabrications,” though it called for patience from supporters.
Rahman’s prolonged absence from Bangladesh — he fled in September 2008 to escape politically motivated prosecutions and life imprisonment sentences under Hasina — created what many described as a leadership vacuum that rivals exploited. His return in December 2025 came only after considerable pressure, and even then, observers questioned whether he could unify a party weakened by years of repression, internal discord, and allegations of corruption.
During the campaign, the BNP faced its greatest vulnerability: 92 leaders denied party nominations contested as rebel candidates in 79 constituencies. Electoral mathematics suggested these rebels could cost the BNP between 15 and 30 seats by splitting the vote, allowing Jamaat to win with as little as 35 percent in three-way contests. That the BNP still secured a comfortable majority speaks to both the depth of its support and the organizational disarray of its opponents.
Yet Rahman inherits a party whose reputation has been tarnished by allegations of extortion and misconduct. “Anyone who remembers them from the early 2000s will recall how violent, thuggish and corrupt they were,” said Naomi Hossain, a professor of Development Studies at SOAS University of London. The BNP’s expulsion of some accused members has done little to repair public trust.
The party’s conservative approach to constitutional reform — proposing a “31-point formula” advocating a bicameral legislature and term limits but resisting more radical restructuring — has also drawn criticism from the youth activists who drove the revolution. “While young activists are demanding transparency, accountability, and a break from the politics of the past,” wrote analyst Shafi Md Mostofa, “the BNP’s failure to embrace a more inclusive and dynamic leadership style has reinforced the perception that the party is out of touch.”
Rahman’s challenge is to reconcile the revolutionary fervor of Bangladesh’s youth with the pragmatic conservatism that defines his party, while simultaneously delivering economic recovery and institutional reform.
Perhaps no relationship will be more critical — or more fraught — than Bangladesh’s ties with India. New Delhi’s decision to shelter Hasina following her ouster, and its refusal to consider extradition despite a November 2024 death sentence for crimes against humanity, has poisoned bilateral relations.
For decades, India viewed Hasina’s Awami League as a strategic partner that countered Islamist extremism, facilitated counterterrorism cooperation, and checked Chinese influence. The BNP, by contrast, has historically leaned toward Pakistan and Middle Eastern nations, raising Indian concerns about Bangladesh’s geopolitical orientation under Rahman.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi moved swiftly to congratulate Rahman, posting on social media that “India will continue to stand in support of a democratic and inclusive Bangladesh.” The statement reflects both diplomatic necessity and underlying anxiety.
New Delhi fears that Rahman’s government might pursue closer ties with China — already Bangladesh’s top trading partner — or Pakistan, both of which would undermine Indian strategic interests along the Bay of Bengal.
“Any government in Dhaka is likely to keep deepening relationships with China to protect long-term economic security,” said Constantino Xavier, a foreign policy fellow at Brookings India. Bangladesh’s recent pivot away from Indian trade toward alignment with China, Pakistan, and Turkey signals a strategic shift that predates Rahman’s election but could accelerate under his leadership.
The Hasina factor complicates everything. Rahman faces domestic pressure to secure her extradition and trial, but pushing too hard risks antagonizing India at a moment when Bangladesh desperately needs regional cooperation. The balancing act requires Rahman to demonstrate independence without provoking New Delhi, to pursue justice without triggering a diplomatic rupture.
Beyond India looms the broader contest between China and the United States for influence in South Asia. Washington is recalibrating its regional strategy, viewing Bangladesh as a potential partner in countering Chinese Belt and Road expansion. The Biden administration supported the democratic transition and will watch closely whether Rahman can deliver institutional reforms while maintaining stability.
China’s economic footprint in Bangladesh is substantial and growing. Beyond trade, Beijing has invested heavily in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications. Rahman’s government will need Chinese capital for development but cannot afford to alienate Washington or regional partners wary of Beijing’s strategic ambitions.
The European Union, United Kingdom, and France — all significant trade partners for Bangladesh’s garment industry, which accounts for the vast majority of exports — will press Rahman on labour rights, democratic governance, and human rights. Bangladesh’s ranking as 151st out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index underscores the governance challenges.
The Middle East and broader Muslim world represent both opportunity and complexity. Rahman’s party advocates Islamic values while positioning itself as centrist, a delicate balance in a region where secular nationalism historically dominated. Gulf states offer potential investment and employment for Bangladeshi workers, but deepening ties with authoritarian regimes could undermine Rahman’s democratic credentials.
Ultimately, Rahman’s political survival may depend less on diplomatic manoeuvring than on economic performance. “Governments of Bangladesh really depend on economic development performance for their legitimacy,” Hossain observed. “This new government is going to have very little fiscal space to help the poor and rebuild the economy.”
GDP growth, which surged over two decades, has slowed since the COVID pandemic. The country imports all its energy, rendering it vulnerable to global commodity shocks. The banking sector’s non-performing loans threaten financial stability. Rahman must navigate a $5.5 billion IMF loan program while delivering tangible improvements to voters who overthrew Hasina precisely because they felt economically abandoned.
Ruchir Desai, fund manager at Asia Frontier Capital, described the BNP victory as positive for investor sentiment, noting that Bangladesh stocks rallied in the weeks before the vote. “This majority win is what was needed as a strong catalyst to revive the economy and stock market,” he said, projecting further gains.
But investor optimism requires Rahman to implement difficult reforms: tackling corruption, restoring institutional independence, professionalizing the civil service, and creating space for opposition voices — including, potentially, reformed elements of the banned Awami League.
The greatest threat to Bangladesh’s democratic reset may be the cycle Chietigj Bajpaee, senior research fellow at Chatham House, calls “revenge politics.” Under Hasina, BNP and Jamaat members faced persecution, imprisonment, and worse. Now, Awami League supporters find themselves purged and marginalized.
“We haven’t really seen any movement towards genuine national reconciliation,” Bajpaee said. “We merely see the pendulum swinging from one extreme to the other.” Breaking this cycle requires Rahman to resist the temptation of victor’s justice, to build institutions stronger than personalities, to create space for dissent without permitting violence.
The alternative — a return to authoritarian governance under different management — would betray the students who died for democracy and guarantee that Bangladesh’s political stability remains hostage to the next uprising.
As Rahman prepares to form Bangladesh’s next government, he inherits a nation transformed by revolution but scarred by decades of authoritarian rule. The election that brought him to power was competitive and relatively peaceful — a triumph in itself — but the hard work of governing a fractured society in a contested region has only begun.
His diplomatic challenges are formidable: managing relations with an aggrieved India sheltering his predecessor, balancing Chinese economic pragmatism against American strategic concerns, maintaining ties with the Muslim world while navigating great power competition, and delivering reform without destabilizing fragile institutions.
His domestic imperatives are urgent: reviving economic growth, combating corruption, restoring public trust, reconciling warring factions, and proving that Bangladesh can sustain democracy without sliding back into the authoritarianism that provoked revolution.
The students who toppled Hasina demanded more than regime change. They demanded transformation. Whether Tarique Rahman — a man who spent 17 years in exile, whose party has its own authoritarian history, who leads a fractured coalition in a deeply polarized nation — can deliver remains the central question facing Bangladesh and the wider region.
The answer will shape not just Bangladesh’s future, but the prospects for democratic governance across South Asia for a generation. (IPA Service)
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