By Ashok Nilakantan Ayers
WASHINGTON: America enters Election Day on Tuesday, November 3, with its political temperature rising and its institutional balance of power hanging in the balance. The midterm elections, ordinarily a referendum on the party occupying the White House, have become something more consequential: a test of Donald Trump’s political authority, the Republican Party’s future and the capacity of American democracy to withstand deepening polarisation.
All 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 Senate seats are being contested, while the Republicans face the possibility of losing their narrow House majority and, less certainly, control of the Senate. The outcome will determine how much freedom Trump retains to pursue his domestic and foreign policy ambitions during the final two years of his presidency.
Yet the numbers alone cannot capture the anxiety surrounding this election. The contest is taking place amid persistent concerns about inflation, a weakening presidential approval rating, bitter arguments over immigration and trade, and renewed disputes about the integrity of the electoral process itself.
The question confronting the country is no longer simply whether Republicans or Democrats will win more seats. It is whether the result will produce a functioning system of checks and balances—or usher in another period of institutional confrontation.
Midterm elections traditionally punish the party in power. The president’s supporters may remain enthusiastic, but opposition voters often become more motivated to turn out, particularly when the administration’s promises collide with the economic realities of everyday life.
The historical exceptions are instructive. In 2002, George W. Bush’s Republicans gained ground in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. But the more familiar pattern is for the president’s party to lose congressional seats as voters reassess the administration halfway through its term.
The political climate facing Trump is especially challenging. The Le Monde account cited presidential approval of 37% and annual inflation of 3.7% in September. A Reuters/Ipsos poll published on November 2 painted an even more difficult picture: Trump’s approval stood at 32%, while Democrats led Republicans 46% to 38% on the generic congressional ballot. The poll also found that the cost of living was a top concern for 78% of respondents.
The economic argument is powerful because it cuts across ideological boundaries. Voters may disagree over immigration, cultural identity, foreign policy and the proper size of government. But the pressure of grocery bills, housing costs, insurance premiums and household budgets is harder to dismiss.
For Republicans, the danger is that the election becomes a national judgment on the president rather than a collection of local contests. Candidates seeking to defend their seats must decide how closely to associate themselves with Trump: embrace him and risk alienating independents, or distance themselves and risk angering his loyal supporters.
That is the central tension within the GOP. Trump’s political influence remains substantial, but the strength of his personal following does not automatically translate into a winning coalition in every congressional district or state.
For Democrats opportunity is mixed with apprehension. The Democrats face a different dilemma. They have a credible opportunity to regain the House, but they must demonstrate that opposition to Trump can become a constructive governing programme rather than an electoral coalition held together by dislike of the president.
The latest Reuters/Ipsos survey found that 49% of Democratic voters were very enthusiastic about voting, compared with 33% of Republicans. Half of independent registered voters said their vote was intended to oppose Trump, against 13% who described it as a vote in his favour.
These figures suggest a potential Democratic advantage in turnout. They do not guarantee victory. National polling averages cannot determine which party wins individual districts, and Senate races are shaped by state-specific political loyalties, candidate quality and the electoral map.
What happens if Trump loses both chambers? A Democratic takeover of the House and Senate would not remove Trump from office. Nor would it automatically end his ability to govern. But it could fundamentally change the political environment in which he exercises presidential power.
Congress controls the legislative process and holds the constitutional power of the purse. It can investigate executive actions, summon administration officials to testify, scrutinise federal expenditure and refuse to approve the president’s legislative priorities. The House can initiate impeachment proceedings, although conviction and removal require a two-thirds majority in the Senate.
The White House would therefore face a much more difficult route to implementing its agenda. Major legislation on taxation, spending, immigration or other contentious issues would require negotiations with an opposition-controlled Congress. Budget disputes could become more frequent, raising the prospect of government funding crises.
Trump could, however, continue using executive orders and other administrative actions. These instruments allow presidents to direct the operations of the executive branch and implement policies within the authority granted by the Constitution and federal law.
A Democratic Congress could challenge the administration’s actions through legislation, hearings, funding restrictions and litigation. Courts would determine the legality of contested executive measures, while the Supreme Court could ultimately decide major constitutional disputes.
The resulting struggle could be prolonged and unpredictable. Some presidential actions might survive judicial review; others might be blocked or overturned. The outcome would depend on the legal basis for each action, the statutes involved and the courts’ interpretation of presidential authority.
The danger is not necessarily presidential paralysis. It is the possibility of government by confrontation: an administration relying increasingly on unilateral action, an opposition-controlled Congress resisting it, and courts repeatedly being drawn into disputes over the boundaries of executive power.
The outcome may produce divided government, a Democratic sweep or a narrower-than-expected Republican survival. Polls provide clues, not certainties, and the final result will depend on individual races and turnout.
What is clear is that the consequences will extend far beyond the balance of seats in Washington. A president accustomed to governing with congressional support could find himself confronting investigations, legislative resistance and a judiciary repeatedly asked to define the limits of executive authority.
America’s constitutional system was designed to prevent any one branch of government from exercising unchecked power. That arrangement can produce friction, delay and political deadlock. But it is also the mechanism through which the republic seeks to balance presidential leadership with legislative accountability.
On November 3, voters will decide who controls Congress. In doing so, they will also help determine how that balance operates during the final two years of Trump’s presidency.
The central question is whether the election will restore a measure of institutional equilibrium—or deepen a political confrontation in which every defeat is treated as illegitimate, every compromise as surrender and every constitutional check as an obstacle to power.
Source note: This article develops the central themes of Pierre Breteau’s November 2, 2026, guide for Le Monde, with additional reporting from Reuters/Ipsos and reference material on judicial review of executive orders. (IPA Service)
