By Ashok Nilakantan Ayers
NEW YORK: Israel has voted, but the country still does not know who will govern it. The parliamentary election has produced a political stalemate that could determine not only Benjamin Netanyahu’s future as prime minister but also the direction of a country exhausted by prolonged wars, mounting military casualties and deep divisions over its leadership.
Preliminary results from Tuesday’s election have placed Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious coalition at 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, Israel’s parliament. The opposition bloc led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot is projected to win 48 seats, while Arab-led parties have secured a combined 19 seats, a historic high.
The arithmetic is stark. A government needs the support of at least 61 lawmakers to command a majority in the Knesset. Neither principal bloc has reached that threshold, leaving the country facing an uncertain period of political negotiations. The final results are still being processed, with the official allocation expected to follow.
The Arab parties, whose combined representation has surged, have consequently emerged as potential kingmakers. Their support could provide Eisenkot with the parliamentary numbers needed to dislodge Netanyahu. Yet the very alliance that could break the deadlock has become one of the principal obstacles to forming a government.
Israel’s immediate question is therefore not simply who won the election. It is whether its political leaders can translate a divided electorate into a functioning administration—or whether voters will be summoned back to the polling stations next year.
Israel’s parliamentary system makes coalition-building indispensable. Voters elect parties through proportional representation, and the resulting distribution of seats determines which combinations can govern. Winning the largest bloc does not automatically guarantee the premiership, nor does finishing second prevent a leader from forming a government.
Netanyahu’s 53-seat bloc remains the largest of the two principal camps, but it is eight seats short of a majority. Eisenkot’s opposition alliance is 13 seats short. The Arab-led parties have 19 seats between them, enough to transform the balance of power if their lawmakers cooperate with the opposition.
The election has thus produced three competing realities. Netanyahu has retained a substantial parliamentary base and remains a formidable political operator. Eisenkot has an opportunity to assemble an alternative government but cannot do so easily without partners he and several of his allies have resisted embracing. Arab parties have won unprecedented leverage, yet their ability to exercise it depends on whether the larger Jewish-led blocs are prepared to negotiate with them.
The result is a paradox: a parliamentary majority opposed to Netanyahu may be mathematically possible, but political and ideological divisions could prevent it from materialising.
Netanyahu remains Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, but longevity has not translated into an uncontested mandate. His leadership has been challenged over the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, the subsequent war in Gaza, the fate of Israeli hostages, relations with the military and the widening regional conflict.
The wars have also imposed a painful human cost on Israeli families. Soldiers have been killed, wounded or traumatised, while their relatives have borne the consequences of repeated deployments and prolonged uncertainty. For families who have lost breadwinners, the loss is both emotional and economic.
The conflict with Iran has further intensified the security burden. Military operations may be defended by the government as necessary to protect Israel, but they also expose the country to casualties, economic disruption and the danger of an expanding regional confrontation.
These issues have fuelled public dissatisfaction with Netanyahu among voters who believe his government has failed to provide adequate security or a credible political endgame. The devastation in Gaza has also sharpened domestic and international criticism of the conduct and consequences of Israel’s military campaign.
Yet Netanyahu’s political difficulties should not be mistaken for the disappearance of his support. His right-wing and religious allies retain a significant constituency, and security concerns can reinforce the appeal of a leader who presents himself as experienced and resolute. The election suggests that his opponents have not yet converted widespread discontent into a sufficiently united parliamentary alternative.
The outcome is therefore a setback for Netanyahu’s opponents, even as his own bloc falls well short of the numbers required to govern alone.
Eisenkot, a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, entered the election seeking to replace Netanyahu and establish a different political direction. His military background gives him credibility on national security, while his opposition to Netanyahu’s leadership has helped bring together parties that might otherwise struggle to cooperate.
But his 48-seat bloc cannot govern without additional support, a broader agreement with other parties or a significant political realignment.
The most obvious route runs through the Arab-led parties. Together, the opposition bloc and those parties command a theoretical total of 67 seats—six more than the parliamentary threshold for a majority.
That arithmetic makes the Arab parties indispensable to any straightforward attempt to remove Netanyahu through an opposition-led coalition.
The difficulty is political. Eisenkot has set conditions for cooperation, including demands concerning recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the rejection of Hamas. Netanyahu has denounced reliance on Arab parties as unacceptable and accused them of supporting forces hostile to Israel. Such allegations must be distinguished from established evidence, and political accusations surrounding the election should not be treated as proof of electoral wrongdoing.
The Arab parties, meanwhile, represent citizens who have their own priorities, including equality, public safety, investment in Arab communities and opposition to discrimination. Their voters have a legitimate stake in the government formed after the election.
If Eisenkot rejects their support outright, his route to the premiership narrows dramatically. If he accepts it, he risks alienating parts of his own coalition and facing attacks from rivals who would portray the arrangement as a threat to national security.
This is the opposition’s central dilemma: it may have the numbers to defeat Netanyahu, but not yet the political agreement required to do so.
President Isaac Herzog now occupies a pivotal constitutional position. Although the presidency is largely ceremonial, the president has an important responsibility after an inconclusive election: consulting political parties and assigning a lawmaker the task of forming a government.
Herzog is not expected simply to declare Netanyahu or Eisenkot the winner. Instead, he must consider which candidate appears most likely to assemble a government capable of obtaining parliamentary confidence.
Once the official results are published, Herzog will consult the parliamentary factions before making his decision. The designated candidate will have a limited period to negotiate a coalition, with a possible extension under the applicable rules. Netanyahu could receive the first opportunity if Herzog judges that he has the better prospects, but that would not guarantee his return at the head of a new government.
Nor must the president immediately call another election because neither bloc has 61 seats. Coalition negotiations come first.
A candidate may attempt to assemble a government through formal coalition agreements, outside support or arrangements under which some lawmakers abstain. Ultimately, however, the government must survive the relevant parliamentary confidence procedure. A nominal agreement between party leaders is not enough if the necessary votes cannot be secured.
If the first candidate fails, another lawmaker may be given an opportunity under the statutory process. If no viable government emerges, and the available parliamentary procedures are exhausted, the country could face another election.
Until a successor government is formed, Netanyahu is expected to remain prime minister in a caretaker capacity. That would preserve administrative continuity but leave the country in an uncomfortable position: a leader whose mandate has been weakened would continue to oversee national affairs, including security decisions, while the political system struggles to produce an alternative.
First, Netanyahu finds a way to govern. He could persuade lawmakers outside his current coalition to join him or negotiate a broader arrangement that changes the balance of power. Such a move would require concessions, particularly if potential partners demand changes in policy or a different relationship with the far right.
Second, Eisenkot builds an alternative majority. Cooperation with Arab-led parties offers the clearest numerical route to a 61-seat government. But the parties would have to overcome profound disagreements and establish sufficient common ground on security, civil rights and the war’s aftermath.
Third, negotiations fail. If neither candidate can command the necessary parliamentary support, Israel may be forced into another election in 2027. Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister until a new government takes office, prolonging uncertainty at a time when the country faces formidable domestic and regional challenges.
For Netanyahu, 53 seats represent survival without security. For Eisenkot, 48 seats offer a potential path to power without a ready-made majority. For the Arab parties, 19 seats provide historic influence but also place them at the centre of a political contest in which their participation is disputed by leaders who may need their support.
Israel’s fate now rests on whether its political class can put together a workable coalition despite deep disagreements over war, security and national identity.
The president will not decide the election’s political meaning by personal preference. His task will be to initiate the constitutional process and determine who has the strongest prospect of forming a government. The decisive test will come in the Knesset, where political promises must be converted into parliamentary votes.
Until then, Netanyahu remains in office, Eisenkot remains a challenger, and Israel remains suspended between a negotiated government and another trip to the ballot box.
The central question is no longer simply who won the election. It is whether anyone can assemble the majority needed to govern a country whose divisions have become as consequential as its wars. (IPA Service)
