Supreme Court calls for Education Secretary reply

IPA Staff
5 Min Read
The Supreme Court has sought a response from Union Education Secretary T. K. Anil Kumar on a contempt petition alleging failure to comply with its earlier direction to consider regulation and monitoring of institutions educating children below 14.

A Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu issued notice to Anil Kumar, Secretary in the Department of School Education and Literacy, Ministry of Education, and directed him to respond within four weeks. The court dispensed with his personal appearance and said the matter would be listed after that period.

Advocate Ashwani Dubey filed the petition.

The contempt petition was filed by advocate Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, who has alleged that the Education Ministry did not act on his representation despite a Supreme Court order requiring the government to consider it. The court made clear during Tuesday’s hearing that the present proceedings are confined to whether its earlier direction was complied with and do not decide the wider constitutional claims raised by the petitioner.

On May 11, the Supreme Court had permitted Upadhyay to make a representation to the Union government on his demands and directed the authorities to take an appropriate decision within two months and communicate it to him. Upadhyay subsequently claimed that no decision was conveyed, leading him to initiate contempt proceedings.

His representation seeks steps to register, recognise, supervise and monitor institutions providing secular education or religious instruction to children up to 14 years of age. The petition invokes Article 21A, which guarantees the right to free and compulsory education for children aged six to 14, along with constitutional provisions concerning the welfare and education of children and the duties of parents or guardians.

Upadhyay has argued that institutions teaching young children should operate under an identifiable regulatory framework irrespective of whether they impart secular lessons, religious instruction or a combination of the two. He has alleged that unregistered and unrecognised institutions function in some areas without sufficient state oversight and has asked for mechanisms to ensure supervision.

The representation was filed after Upadhyay said he had visited districts near the Uttar Pradesh border and encountered institutions that, he alleged, were operating without registration or recognition. He has characterised the absence of oversight as a concern affecting children’s welfare, fraternity and national integration. The court has not endorsed those assertions, and no finding has been made that the institutions referred to in the petition are unlawful or that they have engaged in the conduct alleged.

The petitioner has also raised questions about the interpretation of Article 30 of the Constitution, which protects the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. His plea contends that the provision should not be treated as creating wider privileges for institutions whose principal purpose is religious instruction.

He has further argued that institutions primarily engaged in promoting or propagating religion should fall within the constitutional framework governing religious denominations under Article 26 rather than derive protection solely from Article 30. Those contentions remain allegations and legal submissions by the petitioner and have not been adjudicated in the contempt proceedings.

The Supreme Court’s notice requires the Education Secretary to explain the government’s position on compliance with the May order. Issuance of notice does not amount to a finding that contempt has occurred, and the Bench has not ruled on the merits of Upadhyay’s proposals for registration or monitoring.

The underlying petition also refers to Article 19, which protects the right of citizens to practise a profession or carry on an occupation, trade or business. Upadhyay has sought a declaration on how that provision relates to minority educational rights under Article 30, but the court has so far avoided examining those broader constitutional questions in the present contempt matter.

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