By Arun Srivastava
The agrarian crisis in rural Bihar represents a deeply entrenched structural stagnation that is heavily compounded by severe socio-political tensions and institutional failures. Addressing this crisis requires a shift from state-backed intimidation towards comprehensive economic, judicial, and land reforms. But this is not happening. When a society’s economic and political structures stall permanently, it often erodes the social contract and drives instability.
When economies stagnate structurally, hard work no longer guarantees a better life. As the path to legitimate success narrows, individuals, particularly unemployed or underemployed youth, turn to illicit economies, organized crime, or violent extremist groups as alternative sources of income and status. Persistent stagnation signals to citizens that their government and institutions are either incompetent or corrupt. When people lose faith in legal, political, and judicial systems to resolve conflicts or allocate resources fairly, they are more likely to bypass those systems and resort to political violence, riots, or civil unrest. In a structurally stagnant economy, resources (jobs, wealth, public services) become a fixed pie. Competition encourages violent clashes between different ethnic, social, or regional groups.
This is the state of Bihar. The youths, particularly from upper caste, have become aggressive and the situation has worsened due to the weaponisation of politics by the RSS and BJP. The youths have been handed over trident and guns to silence the critics and secular voices who disagree and protest the divisive and communal Hindutva politics of the saffron ecosystem. Bihar is passing through a very critical phase, where no immediate political panacea is seen to ameliorate the malaise. This has witnessed emergence of class violence but of a different kind, not following in the footsteps of the seventies.
The peasant struggles in central Bihar in the seventies under the leadership of Vinod Mishra, the legendary general secretary of the CPI(ML) Liberation, marked a historic turning point in the socio-political landscape of rural India. The movement fundamentally shattered the absolute dominance of feudal landlords and catalysed a powerful sense of assertion among Dalits and Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs). Mishra transformed the class and caste equations in Bihar.
Before the intensification of the movement in the 1970s and 1980s, landlords exercised undisputed economic and social authority over the rural poor. Under Mishra’s leadership, the CPI(ML) shifted focus toward mass peasant struggles. They forcefully seized surplus, vested, and benami land held illegally by big landlords and distributed it to landless labourers. The organized resistance under the CPI(ML) fought back fiercely the brutalities of the private caste militias. Landlords had realised they could no longer exploit or massacre rural workers with complete impunity. The struggle was different from earlier fights as it intertwined class struggle with caste emancipation. In Bihar’s villages, economic exploitation was historically tied directly to lower-caste identity.
The struggle was not just for higher agricultural wages or land; it was fundamentally for izzat (dignity). Dalits and EBCs refused to perform forced unpaid labour (begar) or bow before upper-caste landlords. Mishra’s strategy helped them transition from passive victims of feudalism to active political agents. This grassroots assertion laid the structural foundation for the broader democratic upsurge of backward classes in Bihar’s mainstream politics during the late 20th century. Scared of this upsurge, the landlords, especially the upper caste Bhumihars, who had floated private militia to finish the militant peasants, used the BJP coming to power for the first time to inspire the feudal elements and land lords and push out the Dalits and EBC from stage of dominance. Slowly but consistently, they have launched a plan to retrieve their lost glory and pride.
Present general secretary of the CPIML, Dipankar Bhattacharya, sums it up: “Across Bihar, one can see signs of renewed feudal violence. The overarching social engineering marvel under the leadership of Nitish Kumar that brought the oppressed and oppressors together in a tenuous social peace has begun to crumble. The disappearance of Nitish Kumar from the scene and the rise of the BJP in the driving seat of the ruling coalition in Bihar signals a feudal restoration of sorts along with a clear intensification of anti-Muslim violence.”
Bhattacharya adds: “Call it feudal-communal power on bulldozers, the mafia forces of Bihar – controlling the entire spectrum of resources from land to sand – are tightening their grip with habitual use of social violence with open administrative backing. The state too is behaving more ruthlessly with police brutalities being reported every now and then. Bihar is also witnessing greater corporate penetration than ever before and the way to corporate takeover is also paved with rural violence.”
A significant shift has undergone in the agrarian and political economy of Bihar under the influence of neoliberalism and the penetration of capital. In classic agrarian conflicts (such as those seen in Bihar during the late 20th century), tension frequently culminated in violent, immediate confrontations over land ownership, low wages, and feudal subjugation. However, the modern socio-economic landscape has changed how landlords and dominant castes approach these conflicts. Due to the penetration of capital and market integration, modern landlords in Bihar are no longer solely dependent on traditional agricultural extraction. Most have diversified their investments into non-farm sectors like real estate, local businesses, government contracting, and education. Urban settlements of Bihar, especially Patna, attracts strong interest for its high growth potential. Because their survival doesn’t rely entirely on immediate crop yields or squeezing agrarian labour, the landlords have less incentive to force a violent showdown or “precipitate the crisis”.
Besides, flow of migrant remittances into rural Bihar has altered the dependency structure. Lower-caste and landless labourers are no longer entirely trapped by local feudal ties; they migrate to urban centres for work. The state apparatus and market forces act as stabilising mechanisms, making localised class warfare less attractive and less profitable for the landed elite. Notwithstanding the favourable indices, it is the feudal mindset that dictates behaviour and how upper castes interact with Dalits and Economically Backward Classes (EBCs).
Social relations between upper castes, OBCs, and Dalits in Bihar remain complex, displaying a dual reality of significant urban integration alongside persistent structural boundaries. While economic and political alignments have shifted, social interactions continue to reflect deep-seated caste divisions. The dynamics of the relation is heavily influenced by the politics of affirmative action (reservations). Many dominant or upper-caste groups express resentment toward OBCs and Dalits over perceived competition in universities and job markets. This friction occasionally translates into everyday social alienation or micro-aggressions, where individuals from reserved categories are colloquially stigmatized.
As Dalits and EBCs gain greater political representation and assert their rights, it is perceived to challenge traditional power structures. Feudal mindsets often manifest in daily practices that attempt to dictate social norms, restrict spatial mobility, or enforce behavioural expectations on marginalized communities. Increased access to education has allowed younger generations to enter professional fields as teaching, nursing, IT, law, and administration. Many work in non-agricultural jobs. This includes driving auto-rickshaws or commercial vehicles, running small repair shops, and working in local brick kilns
Caste-based violence against Dalits and EBCs often spikes as a direct backlash to their socio-economic and political empowerment. Studies and crime data indicate that as marginalized communities assert their constitutional rights, achieve financial independence, or challenge traditional hierarchies, they frequently face retaliatory violence from dominant-caste groups aiming to protect their historical privileges. Today visible markers of upward mobility, individuals wearing modern footwear, or public celebrations of anti-caste icons like Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, frequently trigger violent reactions from dominant groups attempting to enforce old social codes.
After BJP government with Samrat Chaudhary as chief minister came to power, at least four incidents of desecration of statute of Ambedkar have taken place in the state. The vandalism of Ambedkar’s statues is historically and sociologically is an attack on the symbols of Dalit empowerment, constitutional rights, and social justice. These actions underline deliberate attempt of the landlords to suppress Dalit Self-Respect and Assertion as he is the foundational icon of dignity, self-respect, and political awareness for marginalized communities. Vandals through their actions seek to emotionally wound the community and strike a blow against their growing socio-political assertiveness. They also challenge the constitutional values and social justice progress so far. Such acts are executed to reassert dominance and maintain a traditional caste hierarchy. Breaking a community’s core symbol in public spaces is an overt act of intimidation meant to signal that marginalized groups should remain subservient.
Under CM Samrat Choudhary, Bihar has been witnessing eruption of upper-caste violence, and is also experiencing intense aggressive policing and caste-biased law enforcement. A number of custodial deaths have taken place in the state. Since Samrat assumed office as Chief Minister in April 2026, police encounters — informally termed “Operation Langda” or half-encounters where suspects are shot in the leg — have spiked across state. This has been happening behind the façade of Samrat’s assertion that the state’s priority is swift action against crime and strict adherence to good governance (sushasan) rather than appeasing identity politics.
RJD and CPI(ML) have publicly accused the BJP government of executing “caste-based encounters,” alleging that Bihar Police have selectively targeted individuals from specific backward caste identities during anti-crime crackdowns. The relationship between the landowning Bhumihar community, Dalit groups, and BJP forms a complex chapter in Bihar’s socio-political history. Upper castes, especially Bhumihars, form BJP’s core voter base in Bihar, but the as a part of its electoral strategy requires building alliances with prominent Dalit and Mahadalit leaders—such as Chirag Paswan (LJP-RV) and Jitan Ram Manjhi (HAM)—to secure Dalit representation and support within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).
Significantly, since Samrat becoming the deputy chief minister in 2024, while Nitish was CM, upper caste had already become active and assertive. There have been notable incidents of rural unrest in Bihar as the 2024 land dispute in Nawada, where over 20 Mahadalit homes were set on fire. As usual the official data claims that Bihar is not witnessing resurgence of rural violence. Even when collective violence occurs, it rarely follows the binary upper-caste vs. lower-caste template of the past. The administration uses their old tasted formula of attributing these to war between two criminal gangs. During last two years at least incidents of lynching has taken place. Fact-finding teams of CPI(ML) had found that Shravan Paswan and Pinto Paswan were killed in Biharshariff. Mob lynching took place in Aurangabad. In Siwan, a left cadre Jay Shankar Pandey was killed. Besides, Sunil Chandra and RajKumar Majhi were killed in different incidents. Two incidents of putting harijan bastis (ghettos) on fire have also taken place.
CM Samrat Choudhary’s tenure has been marked by a polarizing “hardline” approach to law and order heavily influenced by neighbouring Uttar Pradesh’s crime control strategies. It is being carried out on the plea of cleansing rural areas of crime. Only a couple of months back, Bharat Tiwari, a 28-year-old social activist who had no criminal record, was encountered in Bhojpur for raising the issues the people of the village Bilauti were facing. CM Samrat’s rule has fuelled a distinct wave of police atrocities, encounter killings, and local violence. The videos making rounds showed that he had thrown the revolver he was carrying long before his encounter. But the police claimed it a case of self-defence. The killing sparked a massive mahapanchayat (large community gathering) in rural Bihar, serving as a focal point for growing rural anxiety over unchecked police power.
The situation has forced a major section of leaders of Nitish Kumar’s JD(U) to come out of the NDA alliance. They are scared that BJP may further intensify its ruthless actions against the rural poor and Dalits. Janata Dal (United), of Nitish Kumar, is facing an acute structural transition in Bihar and the party is trying to rebalance and prevent a clean disintegration along caste lines. But it does not appear to be working, though it would provide temporary relief. In a situation when the caste structure in the state is under intense churning, not only the EBC but also the OBCs are restructuring their support to JDU, and even the upper castes like Rajputs and Brahmins, are exploring new avenues, a major caste rearrangement appears to be imminent. (IPA Service)
