By Dr Arun Mitra
On 14 July 2026, a bipartisan group of US senators unveiled a revised Russia sanctions bill that proposes punitive tariffs on the largest buyers of Russian energy, including India, the second-largest importer of Russian crude. The legislation, originally championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham before his sudden demise, seeks to reduce Russia’s oil and gas revenues by discouraging third countries from continuing energy trade with Moscow.
The bill reportedly enjoys the support of 84 senators, well above the 60 votes required for passage in the Senate. Unlike an executive order, which can be modified or revoked by the President, legislation passed by Congress becomes statutory law and can only be amended through the legislative process. Since the bill is linked to the Ukraine conflict, it is expected to receive cross-party support, increasing its chances of becoming law.
The proposal comes at a time when the global energy market is already under severe strain. The continuing conflict in the Middle East and the disruption of energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz have heightened concerns over global oil availability and rising prices. The United States has also continued to restrict Iranian oil exports, further tightening supply.
India is particularly vulnerable to these developments. Nearly 48% of India’s crude oil imports—approximately 2.4 million barrels per day—come from the Gulf region, with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates remaining its principal suppliers. In recent years, discounted Russian crude has become an important component of India’s energy security, helping contain import costs and domestic fuel prices.
If the proposed sanctions become law, India could face the difficult choice of either continuing to purchase Russian oil and risking punitive US tariffs or shifting to more expensive suppliers. Alternative sources such as Venezuela involve higher transportation costs, quality concerns, and geopolitical complications. The resulting increase in India’s energy bill could have significant implications for inflation and economic growth.
China has reacted sharply to the proposed legislation, describing it as an example of unilateral bullying, double standards, and economic coercion. Beijing has indicated that it will take appropriate countermeasures to safeguard its national interests.
India, by contrast by its stance seems to be succumbing to US bullying. This is line with India’s not speaking a single word against the Trump’s repeated rhetoric after operation Sindoor that he forced India and Pakistan to stop the war.
The stakes are high because the United States remains India’s largest export market. India’s exports to the US are valued at around $87 billion annually, while imports from the US amount to approximately $53 billion, giving India a trade surplus of nearly $34 billion. Major Indian exports include electrical machinery, telecommunications equipment, pharmaceuticals, and gems and jewellery, while key American exports include crude oil, liquefied natural gas, aircraft components, and advanced technology products.
At the same time, India has reportedly agreed in principle to substantially increase imports of US products to US$ 500 billion over the next five years as part of an ongoing bilateral trade framework. The proposed purchases include agriculture and dairy products, energy products, precious metals, coal, aircraft & aircraft parts and advanced technology, including graphics processing units (GPUs) for data centres. If implemented, these commitments could significantly alter the present trade balance between the two countries. It is well understood that greater market access for American agricultural and dairy products in India would adversely affect Indian farmers and the domestic agricultural and dairy sector.
These developments acquire added importance because India currently holds the chairmanship of BRICS and will host the BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026. The grouping now includes major economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, the UAE, and several other members.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has previously observed that India has often aligned with the United States on several issues within BRICS. One notable example was India’s reluctance to support proposals for a common BRICS currency intended to reduce global dependence on the US dollar.
Against this backdrop, the proposed sanctions legislation presents India with a significant diplomatic and strategic challenge. India has long-standing strategic partnership with Russia and there is nothing on record that Russia has ever tried to bully our country. Succumbing to US pressures could have serious implications on our standing within BRICS particularly at a time when India holds its chair.
Critics argue that despite India’s increasingly close relationship with Washington, successive US administrations have continued to exert pressure on New Delhi on issues ranging from trade to strategic policy. This has put India in a very uncomfortable position in the geopolitics. India’s international image is at a lowest ebb particularly after the Prime Minister’s all out support to Israel while addressing its Knesset on 25th February 2026 terming ‘India as motherland and Israel as fatherland’.
India’s economy is in a poor shape. The GDP growth rate of nearly 7% figure of the government is contested by many economists who term it to be around 2.5% only.
The proposed tariff legislation therefore raises a broader question: Will India, as the chair of BRICS, assert greater strategic autonomy and resist external economic pressure, or will it continue to accommodate US demands?
The answer may not only define India’s response to the current sanctions proposal but also shape the future direction of its foreign policy, relationship with the countries of the Global South and its leadership within BRICS. (IPA Service)
